United Nations S/2011/385

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 June 2011

Original: English

France, Germany, Portugal, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Noting with concern that the situation in the Middle East is tense and is likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force of 13 June 2011 (S/2011/359), and also reaffirming its resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,

Expressing grave concern at the serious events that occurred in UNDOF's area of operations on 15 May and 5 June that put the long-held ceasefire in jeopardy,

1. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;

2. *Calls on* all parties to cooperate fully with the operations of UNDOF and to ensure the security of as well as unhindered and immediate access for the United Nations personnel carrying out their mandate, in conformity with existing agreements;

3. *Recalls* the obligation on both parties to fully respect the terms of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, and *calls on* the parties to exercise maximum restraint and prevent any breaches of the ceasefire and the area of separation;

4. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;

5. *Decides* to renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for a period of six months, that is, until 31 December 2011;

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6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of this period, a report on developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973), including an assessment, with recommendations if any, of the operational capacity of UNDOF to ensure the Force is most appropriately configured to fulfil its mandated tasks.

United Nations A/65/869–S/2011/386

General Assembly
Security Council

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21 June 2011

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General Assembly
Sixty-fifth session
Agenda item 33
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 17 June 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation of 9 June 2011 on the outcome of the sixteenth round of the Geneva discussions on security and stability in Transcaucasia (see annex).

I would like to request your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 33.

(*Signed*) Vitaly **Churkin**

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Annex to the identical letters dated 17 June 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Security Council and the President of the Security Council

Outcome of the latest round of Geneva discussions on security and stability in Transcaucasia

At the sixteenth round of Geneva discussions on security and stability in Transcaucasia held in Geneva on 7 June 2011, the increased aggressiveness of the Georgian delegation stood out clearly. It tried to attribute all the failures of the Tbilisi leadership in domestic and international affairs to the intrigues of Russia. The Georgian side made groundless accusations that Russian secret services had been behind some "terrorist attacks" on Georgian territory. Characteristically, one more arrest of a "saboteur" near the North Atlantic Treaty Organization liaison office in Tbilisi on 6 June occurred immediately before the multilateral meeting in Geneva.

However, the facts of recent months (the penetration of Georgian Interior Ministry special forces into Abkhazia, the killing of a Russian border service officer in April, the incidents in South Ossetia) clearly demonstrate who is actually undermining the nascent stabilization in Transcaucasia.

We're witnessing the increased activity of Georgian secret services near the boundaries. Since the beginning of the year, 12 raids by Georgian subversive groups into the territory of the Republic of Abkhazia, mostly in the Gali district, have been registered. These actions are inherently linked to the anti-Russian campaign of spy mania in Georgia and to attempts to find a "Russian connection" in the activities of Georgia's internal opposition.

In this regard, during the debate, the Russian delegation stressed the need for more careful control by European Union observers over the actions of Georgian security agencies in areas bordering Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Once again, it was noted that the mandate of the European Union Monitoring Mission does not apply to the adjacent areas of the newly independent States.

As regards the transition to practical steps for confidence-building measures, transparency and the exchange of information, our position remains unchanged. It is necessary that legally binding agreements of the non-use of threat of force should be signed between Tskhinval and Tbilisi and between Sukum and Tbilisi. Unfortunately, we cannot speak here of any progress at all.

The stubborn unwillingness of official Tbilisi to regard the representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as equal partners in the negotiations results in the lack of progress in solving the entire range of problems associated with the return of refugees and displaced persons. Due to the fact that Georgia has once again submitted the respective draft resolution to the General Assembly, it is clear that without the participation of Abkhaz and South Ossetian delegations the General Assembly debate could turn into a political farce.

The outcome of the round confirms that the Georgian side has still not put forward my construction proposals to forge ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia and is increasingly slipping into propaganda rhetoric.

United Nations S/2011/387

Security Council

Distr.: General
24 June 2011

Original: English

Twenty-eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1962 (2010) and 1981 (2011), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) until 31 July 2011 and requested me to provide a report by 30 June 2011, including the findings and recommendations of an assessment mission to Côte d'Ivoire. The report covers developments since my report of 30 March 2011 (S/2011/211).

II. Update on major developments

2. Following my last report, the situation in Côte d'Ivoire continued to deteriorate until former President Gbagbo was apprehended on 11 April 2011. As Mr. Gbagbo rebuffed all efforts for a peaceful solution to the violent crisis, the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI), which were established by a decree issued by President Ouattara on 17 March, continued their military offensive towards Abidjan, capturing towns in the west, centre and east. The former Forces de défense et de sécurité (FDS), including police and gendarmerie, fled in large numbers, with some joining the ranks of FRCI, while others surrendered or sought refuge in UNOCI camps.

3. By 30 March, FRCI had encircled Abidjan. President Ouattara ordered the force to hold its positions outside the city in order to give Mr. Gbagbo a last chance to leave peacefully and to avoid further fighting. He also reached out to FDS commanders to join FRCI. The FDS Chief of Staff, General Mangou, sought refuge with his family at the residence of the Ambassador of South Africa on 30 March. He rejoined the pro-Gbagbo forces on 3 April. On 31 March, the Abidjan Air Force Base Commander and 100 troops surrendered to FRCI. UNOCI and the French Operation Licorne force secured the airport. FDS also abandoned its checkpoints around the Golf Hotel, the temporary seat of the legitimate Government.

4. As FDS continued to disintegrate, the Republican Guard and the Centre de commandement des opérations de sécurité (CECOS), which remained loyal to Mr. Gbagbo, concentrated their presence and heavy weapons in strategic locations in Abidjan. They escalated attacks against the civilian population, including with heavy weapons, which prompted FRCI to enter Abidjan. Pro-Gbagbo forces targeted

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UNOCI headquarters with intense heavy calibre sniper fire and mortars, wounding four peacekeepers and seven others during several heavy weaponry attacks on UNOCI patrols. One international UNOCI staff member and one national World Health Organization staff member were killed during the fighting in Abidjan.

5. In light of these developments, I instructed UNOCI to take all necessary measures in keeping with paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1975 (2011) of 30 March 2011 to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population. Pursuant to Council resolution 1962 (2010), I also wrote to President Sarkozy of France seeking the assistance of the Licorne force. On 4 April, UNOCI and Licorne conducted military operations in Abidjan to prevent the continued use of heavy weapons against civilians. Fighting subsequently subsided on 5 April. The same day, Alcide Djédjé, Mr. Gbagbo's "minister of foreign affairs", initiated negotiations with the Government on ending the crisis, while leaders of the security forces loyal to Mr. Gbagbo claimed they had ordered their troops to lay down their arms. In a statement later that day, however, Mr. Gbagbo insisted that he had won the election and called for a recount.

6. On 6 April, the fighting resumed with pro-Gbagbo forces again using heavy weapons against civilians in various neighbourhoods. UNOCI headquarters and patrols were again targeted, including by heavy weapons. Diplomatic premises were also targeted and one of them was occupied by the pro-Gbagbo forces. The situation escalated on 9 April when Mr. Gbagbo's forces launched an attack on the Golf Hotel, including with mortars and heavy machine guns, which was successfully repelled. One peacekeeper was wounded during the attack.

7. During the fighting, United Nations personnel, staff of diplomatic missions and foreign nationals were trapped in insecure areas in Abidjan. Many of them, including 400 foreign nationals, were extricated by UNOCI, in cooperation with Licorne. UNOCI relocated most United Nations international staff from Abidjan to Bouaké. Throughout the fighting, it provided medical services to civilians in need.

8. In light of the continued use of heavy weapons against the civilian population and peacekeepers, I again instructed UNOCI, on 10 April, to take all necessary measures to prevent their use against the civilian population. On the same day, UNOCI, with the support of the Licorne force, conducted further military operations targeting heavy weapons in areas around the presidential palace and residence, and several military camps.

9. On 11 April, Mr. Gbagbo, his wife and members of his family, staff and "cabinet" were apprehended by FRCI in a bunker in the presidential residence. On 13 April, former President Gbagbo was transferred to a location in northern Côte d'Ivoire, while his wife was brought to a separate location. Their initial hearings were started by a State prosecutor in May. Some 70 of the family and staff members arrested with Mr. Gbagbo were released on 16 April. Some were transferred to the Bouna prison, while others, citing security concerns, moved to the Pergola Hotel in Abidjan, where the Government requested UNOCI to assist in providing security for them. The Government later announced that those individuals were under house arrest. Mr. Gbagbo's Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) party stated that many of its supporters had fled to Ghana.

10. Many commanders of the security forces, including General Mangou and the CECOS and Air Force Commanders, pledged allegiance to President Ouattara. Other

senior officers of the security institutions have been arrested by FRCI, including the Commander of the Republican Guard, and are being detained. The whereabouts of Blé Goudé remained unknown, although recorded statements allegedly by him were broadcast in late May. The Prosecutor of the Military Tribunal launched an investigation on 12 May into crimes committed by the military and the police.

11. Meanwhile, during a press conference on 19 April, Ibrahima "IB" Coulibaly announced that his forces, known as the "Invisible Commandos", who had taken up arms against pro-Gbagbo forces in Abidjan's Abobo neighbourhood, were at the disposal of President Ouattara. However, Mr. Coulibaly declined to attend a meeting with representatives of the Government on 26 April. On 27 April, after his forces clashed with FRCI, he refused to leave Abobo, although he had earlier that day requested a UNOCI escort to assist him to leave the area. Later that day, the Government announced that Mr. Coulibaly had been killed during the fighting. Many of his supporters went into hiding. Some 800 of them were registered and disarmed by UNOCI on 4 June. Only about 30 serviceable weapons and a limited amount of ammunition were handed over.

12. Although fighting abated in Abidjan after 11 April, pro-Gbagbo militias, mercenaries and FDS elements held out and continued to fight in Yopougon district. Serious human rights violations were committed and mass graves were discovered before FRCI dislodged the remaining elements from Yopougon on 4 May. Some 50 of those elements surrendered to FRCI on 29 April. The rest fled towards the Liberian border area, where they continued to kill civilians and loot property in south-western Côte d'Ivoire. Clashes between the FRCI and pro-Gbagbo militias and mercenaries continued to be reported there, as well as violence against civilians in the west and south-west.

13. In mid-April, UNOCI started joint patrols with FRCI. UNOCI has also assisted in collecting and registering some 500 weapons, including heavy weapons, and 65,000 rounds of ammunition. Most are being secured by UNOCI, while some have been handed over to FRCI. Most materiel collected appears to have been imported prior to the arms embargo. UNOCI is also clearing unexploded ordnance in Abidjan.

14. Serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law occurred throughout the fighting, including the killing and abduction of civilians, enforced disappearances, extortion, sexual violence and looting of property. Several hundred people were killed in Duékoué and the surrounding villages on 28 and 29 March. The state broadcaster, Radiodiffusion-Télévision ivoirienne (RTI), continued to broadcast hate messages and incite violence until it went off the air on 5 April. The Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, Ivan Simonovic, visited Côte d'Ivoire from 2 to 9 April and the International Commission of Inquiry, established by the Human Rights Council on 25 March, visited the country from 4 to 28 May.

15. The humanitarian situation further deteriorated during the reporting period, with an increase in populations displaced inside the country as well as to neighbouring countries, primarily Liberia. On 4 and 5 April, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Valerie Amos, visited western Côte d'Ivoire to highlight the immense consequences of the conflict.

16. As the situation slowly began to stabilize following Mr. Gbagbo's apprehension, the Government took a number of initiatives to restore normalcy. On

1 May, President Ouattara announced the establishment of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, with former Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny as its Chair. The announcement was made during a visit by a delegation of The Elders comprised of former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa and former President Mary Robinson of Ireland, during which they also met with Mr. Gbagbo. On 5 May, the President of the Constitutional Council reversed the election results he had announced on 3 December and President Ouattara was sworn-in by the Constitutional Council on 6 May. I visited Côte d'Ivoire to attend President Ouattara's inauguration ceremony in Yamoussoukro on 21 May, which was attended by some 20 Heads of State. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le Roy, visited the country from 18 to 22 May.

17. President Ouattara appointed the governors of Abidjan and Yamoussoukro on 28 April, and replaced other senior officials, including two members of the Constitutional Council and the Presidents of the Supreme Court and the Economic and Social Council, on 12 May. On 1 June, President Ouattara announced his new Government, headed by Prime Minister Soro and comprising 36 ministers, including 5 women. The Government includes 14 members of President Ouattara's Rassemblement des républicains (RDR) party, 8 from former President Bédié's Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), 5 from the Forces nouvelles and 5 from civil society. The remaining portfolios are held by smaller parties. Mr. Gbagbo's FPI party declined the offer to join the inclusive Government, demanding that former President Gbagbo be released from detention first. President Ouattara presided over the first meeting of the Council of Ministers on 8 June.

18. Commercial activity has gradually resumed in Abidjan. To date, some 20 banks have reopened and financial services have been progressively restored throughout the country. On 27 April, the branches of the Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest reopened in Abidjan and the West African Economic and Monetary Union appointed a new Governor on 30 May. On 13 April, President Ouattara announced the resumption of cocoa exports and on 21 April, the African Union lifted the sanctions it had imposed on Côte d'Ivoire, while the European Union followed in part on 29 April.

III. Assessment mission

19. As requested by members of the Security Council, I dispatched an assessment mission to Côte d'Ivoire from 1 to 14 May 2011. Participants included representatives of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Safety and Security as well as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Children's Fund.

20. The assessment mission received detailed briefings from UNOCI and the United Nations country team, the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the Licorne force, and consulted with President Ouattara, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Soro, the Ministers of the Interior, Justice and Human Rights, Finance, Planning, Civil Service and Employment, General Soumaila Bakayoko of FRCI as well as the President of the Independent Electoral Commission, the

leadership of the national security, the diplomatic community, civil society, political parties, including FPI, and international and national non-governmental organizations. Members of the mission visited Daloa, Duékoué and Man in the west, and Bouaké in the north.

IV. Findings of the assessment mission

21. The assessment mission's discussions with the President, the Prime Minister and his Government, as well as other national and international stakeholders, provided a clear picture of the main challenges the Government is facing. All interlocutors identified the stabilization of the security situation, in particular in Abidjan and the west, as the highest priority. The other immediate priorities included: fostering national reconciliation while, in parallel, addressing impunity and accountability; the reconstitution and reform of security and rule of law institutions; the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups; the collection of illicit weapons from civilian communities; the re-establishment of State administration throughout the country; the protection of civilians; addressing the humanitarian situation; the development of a subregional strategy to address the threat of mercenaries, militias and the cross-border movement of weapons; and the holding of legislative elections.

A. Security situation

22. The security situation in the country, especially in Abidjan and the west, remains extremely precarious. There is still a high risk of renewed armed conflict and attacks against the civilian population continue. These could be initiated by the many ex-Republican Guard soldiers who have melted into the civilian population in Abidjan together with their weapons, as well as the pro-Gbagbo militias, mercenaries and former FDS personnel routed from Abidjan, who are attempting to regroup in the west, Young Patriots and Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire (FESCI) members who still have access to arms and elements of the "Invisible Commandos" who have gone into hiding with their weapons. FDS, including the police and gendarmerie, have disintegrated and FRCI is the only national security institution that is currently undertaking security, law enforcement and public order maintenance tasks. However, FRCI could become a threat itself if urgent steps are not taken to address its basic needs, command and control issues, and discipline-related challenges. Furthermore, civilian communities were systematically militarized by the former regime and are awash with weapons. The escape from prisons of more than 12,000 prisoners since March presents another serious challenge.

23. The recent fighting in the west has brought to the surface long-standing ethnic, citizenship and land ownership issues, and the attempted regrouping of pro-Gbagbo elements in this traditionally volatile area could reignite conflict there. There have also been reports of unexploded ordnance in the west and landmines in Tiébissou and Abidjan, which pose a danger to the population.

B. State of security and rule of law institutions

24. FDS, including the police and gendarmerie, were detrimentally politicized during the crisis and have effectively disintegrated, though some have rejoined under the auspices of FRCI. The prison institutions have also essentially collapsed in the south and have not been fully operational in the north since 2002. Most of the police, gendarmerie, judicial and prisons infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed.

25. The Government has indicated that FRCI will be the institution around which the new armed forces will be reconstructed, while the formation of the police, gendarmerie and corrections system will be based upon the old services. In this regard, there is an urgent need for the Government to conduct a comprehensive review of the security institutions and devise a national security strategy and plan for its implementation. There is also a need to develop and implement a national justice sector strategy, which will be coordinated through a Comité de pilotage et suivi presided by the Ministry of Justice. Many bilateral partners have expressed an interest in providing support for the rebuilding, reform and development of the security and rule of law institutions. The Government is planning to hold a national seminar in July to discuss issues pertaining to security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and national reconciliation. Prime Minister Soro has requested that the United Nations assign a security sector reform adviser to support his office, while some bilateral partners have also been requested to do the same.

26. Initial assistance from UNOCI will be required, while long-term assistance should be provided by bilateral partners and relevant United Nations agencies. United Nations assistance will complement the efforts of other partners. As foreseen in the Ouagadougou Agreements, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Facilitator, President Compaoré of Burkina Faso, will continue to support the reunification of the armed and police forces.

1. Armed forces

27. FRCI remains an unconventional, amorphous and poorly resourced force. It is comprised of a mixture of former Forces armées des Forces nouvelles (FAFN) personnel, some former FDS personnel who defected before Mr. Gbagbo's arrest and many untrained young men who were recruited during the FRCI offensive. Its current size is yet to be confirmed. As a result of the lack of regular salary payments, some FRCI elements were resorting to extortion and looting in Abidjan and other parts of the country. However, the Government started paying salaries to FRCI in May. The various mixes of military uniforms project a negative image and are exploited by criminals who impersonate FRCI personnel. Some interlocutors noted the current lack of confidence of parts of the population in FRCI. The Government welcomed the suggestion that it approach bilateral partners to request them to donate uniforms for FRCI. With regard to reunifying the future army, President Ouattara advised that the framework and the quotas provided for in the Ouagadougou Agreements remained valid and would be maintained.

28. While the Government has already taken a decision to eventually send FRCI to the barracks and deploy the police and gendarmerie to maintain law and order, there are still a number of serious dilemmas. First, the Government's efforts to reconstruct

the crumbled police and gendarmerie will take time to gain traction. Secondly, despite the shortcomings of FRCI, a premature complete withdrawal of the force to the barracks could lead to serious setbacks to efforts to stabilize the security situation.

2. Police and gendarmerie

29. The police and gendarmes, of whom there were some 30,000 before the crisis, are only slowly returning to work, despite the confidence-building measures by UNOCI to encourage law enforcement personnel to return to duty. To date, 85 per cent have registered to resume duty but very few are actually working. They undertake very limited activities, mostly jointly with FRCI. Many interlocutors assessed these law enforcement institutions negatively, even without the impact of the crisis, pointing to impunity, lack of accountability, politicization, corruption, absenteeism and lack of training and equipment.

30. The Government highlighted the lack of weapons for the police. In a letter dated 3 May, the Minister of the Interior requested UNOCI to hand over weapons that it has collected to the Ivorian police. However, UNOCI is obliged to verify, in coordination with the Group of Experts, if these weapons were imported in violation of the arms embargo regime before handing them over to the authorities.

3. Judicial and corrections institutions

31. As a result of the crisis, the judicial system practically ceased to function, with the judiciary collapsing in the south. Seventeen of the 26 courts in the south were partially damaged or looted during this period. In the north, many of the redeployed judges and prosecutors abandoned their posts. In addition, the judiciary suffers from a lack of independence, insufficient material and financial resources, inefficient proceedings, politicization of its personnel, inadequate case management systems, corruption and poor public perception. The impact of the crisis on the corrections system was equally dire. Prisons ceased to function in the south and were damaged; all prisoners escaped from the 22 prisons in the south and have yet to be recaptured. In the north, only 3 of the 11 prisons were operational prior to the crisis.

32. The European Union signed a project in the amount of €18 million with the Government on 6 May for the reform and modernization of the judicial and prison systems with a view to reinforcing the capacities of the Government to improve access to justice, reform courts and improve detention conditions. UNOCI is assisting in the renovation of some prisons in Abidjan and other locations in the south.

C. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, and dismantling of militias

33. The post-elections crisis has significantly increased the magnitude of the disarmament and demobilization challenge as a result of new recruitment and the proliferation of armed groups. The caseload of combatants has increased, but the numbers remain unclear at this stage, with estimates ranging from 50,000 to 100,000 cases. Given the diverse caseload, agreeing on appropriate eligibility criteria for participation in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and managing expectations will be key challenges in developing a new programme. National stakeholders also emphasized the pressing need for reintegration and youth employment programmes.

D. Collection of weapons from civilian communities

34. A very high number of weapons remain in civilian communities, in particular in Abidjan and the west. It was a policy of the former regime to systematically arm sympathetic communities and thousands of weapons were distributed to militias, youth and other groups throughout the country, which intensified during the crisis. FDS stockpiles of weapons were also looted, including by civilians, as FDS disintegrated. As a result, the threat of local armed violence remains across Côte d'Ivoire owing to the availability of a large number of weapons.

E. Redeployment of State administration and extension of State authority

35. The post-elections crisis further curtailed the reach of State authority and its administration. National stakeholders expressed the view that the reunification of the country, including the centralization of the Treasury, should now be easier to achieve owing to the changed political context. In the west and south, the crisis brought to the fore the weakness of State institutions, including the politicization of State officials and inability to deliver services. Civil servants are slowly returning to work, but remain largely absent in the west, while most Government ministries and territorial State administrations will take some time to become fully operational because public buildings were vandalized, records were destroyed and equipment was looted. The Government is undertaking an inventory of the physical destruction of State premises and equipment. Many interlocutors stressed the need to strengthen institutions by addressing issues of corruption, transparency and governance.

F. Political situation and legislative elections

36. The inauguration of President Ouattara in Yamoussoukro marked a major step towards the full restoration of constitutional order. Although, FPI declined to participate in the Government, FPI members and associates of former President Gbagbo who are currently held at the Pergola Hotel confirmed that they recognized President Ouattara as the legitimate President, stating that they were willing to contribute to the process of national reconciliation and reconstruction. They also advocated for the adoption of an amnesty law covering all acts and offences committed during the post-elections crisis.

37. All national stakeholders, except FPI members of the National Assembly, stressed the need to hold legislative elections as soon as possible and before the end of the year. They emphasized that those elections were important for the full restoration of constitutional order in Côte d'Ivoire, national reconciliation and inclusive governance. Formidable challenges will need to be overcome to meet the envisaged timeline. The headquarters of the Independent Electoral Commission and its offices throughout the country were vandalized, equipment and vehicles were looted and records were destroyed. Funding needs to be mobilized; displaced populations and refugees need to return; outstanding cases of identification of eligible voters need to be addressed; the electoral roll needs to be updated; and the electoral districts need to be delimited. The security situation has to stabilize sufficiently and a political environment conducive for the elections must be created.

With regard to the composition of the Independent Electoral Commission, President Ouattara advised that the formula that had been agreed to in the Pretoria Agreement would be maintained. This, however, could become a contentious issue. Meanwhile, most interlocutors expected the certification mandate of my Special Representative to continue. A United Nations electoral needs assessment mission is visiting Côte d'Ivoire from 18 to 30 June.

G. National reconciliation and transitional justice

38. President Ouattara has established a Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission but also stressed that national reconciliation will not mean impunity. Although Côte d'Ivoire is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, former President Gbagbo had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in 2003. This was confirmed by President Ouattara in a letter dated 3 May 2011, in which he also asked the Court Prosecutor to conduct an investigation into the most serious crimes committed since 28 November 2010 and to bring those responsible to justice. After a preliminary examination, the Prosecutor concluded that there is a reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court have been committed in Côte d'Ivoire since 28 November 2010. In a letter dated 19 May 2011, the Prosecutor informed the President of the Court of his intention to request the Pretrial Chamber to authorize him to open an investigation into the situation in Côte d'Ivoire. On 20 May 2011, the International Criminal Court announced that the President of the Court had assigned the situation in Côte d'Ivoire to Pretrial Chamber II.

39. However, a comprehensive transitional justice approach that includes prosecutions, truth-telling, reparations, vetting and institutional reforms is essential. In light of issues relating to land ownership and citizenship in the west, many stakeholders emphasized the importance of interventions that address the root causes of the conflict and foster social cohesion at the community level, in particular since the return of displaced persons to their respective communities in the west is likely to exacerbate tensions further.

H. Human rights situation

40. The post-elections violence triggered widespread human rights violations, sexual-based violence and serious violations against children. The International Commission of Inquiry submitted its report to the Human Rights Council on 15 June. It concluded that serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law were committed during the crisis, when some 3,000 persons were estimated to be killed. The Commission stressed that national reconciliation without justice would not be sustainable and recommended that the Government conduct complete, impartial and transparent investigations of human rights violations and bring those responsible to justice.

41. While human rights violations have decreased in terms of intensity, formidable challenges remain: the population continues to be vulnerable owing to the fragile security situation and the security vacuum in certain areas, the proliferation of arms and armed groups, the presence of explosive remnants of war, the severe weakening of institutions responsible for the protection of human rights and the legacy of

impunity. There is also the continuing risk of reprisals, which could undermine efforts in support of social cohesion and reconciliation. UNOCI has received reports of several cases involving FRCI elements, which are being investigated. All interlocutors, including the President and the Prime Minister, recognized that addressing impunity and ensuring accountability and the effective protection of human rights will be essential.

1. Sexual and gender based violence

42. Sexual violence remains pervasive throughout the country and is particularly acute in the west. More than 300 cases of sexual- and gender-based violence, of which 118 are rape cases, have been reported since January 2011. Although some of those attacks were committed by men in uniform, the majority of the perpetrators were known to the victim.

2. Children

43. Children were victims of large-scale violations during the crisis. There was a sharp rise in the recruitment of children into militia groups and other armed groups loosely affiliated with FRCI, while the incidence of child recruitment was relatively low in the regular armed forces. Some children were seen carrying arms, while others reportedly supported armed groups at checkpoints. A total of 77 cases of killing and maiming of children during the crisis, as well as cases of sexual violence against children perpetrated by the pro-Gbagbo militia, mercenaries and FRCI, have been documented.

I. Protection of civilians

44. The current state of the Ivorian security and law enforcement agencies compromises their ability to protect civilians, and they will take time to be reconstituted. This will require UNOCI and the United Nations country team to continue to protect civilians within their respective mandates.

J. Role of the media

45. President Ouattara stressed the urgent need for the media, which has been heavily politicized and partisan, to play a more positive role in future and to contribute to national reconciliation. In this regard, the President and many other national stakeholders called for measures to ensure the effective functioning of the regulatory bodies, notably the National Press Council (CNP) and the recently established High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HACA).

K. Humanitarian situation

46. Some 300,000 persons have been displaced within Côte d'Ivoire, mainly in Abidjan and the west, and over 200,000 persons have fled to neighbouring countries, primarily Liberia. Given the prevailing insecurity and the continuing fear of retaliation, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons remains slow, and there could be a protracted situation caused by displacement. In the west, the

return of displaced persons to their respective communities is likely to raise unresolved issues related to the root causes of the crisis, in particular access to land and ownership of property. There is therefore an urgent need to link humanitarian assistance with a strong recovery programme, address social cohesion at the national and community levels, especially in the west, and promote peacebuilding activities.

47. The crisis also disrupted livelihoods and basic social services, which worsened living conditions. Apart from addressing immediate recovery priorities, including the delivery of basic public services, the economic empowerment of women and youth will be critical to facilitate their participation in the stabilization and peace processes. The Government has started to address the most pressing needs of the population through its $100 million programme d'urgence aimed at relaunching basic social services with funding from the European Union and France. The revised Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan remains seriously underfunded, with only 25 per cent of its $180 million requirements covered as at 8 June.

L. Economic situation

48. The Ivorian economy was hit hard by the crisis and a negative growth rate of real gross domestic product is expected for 2011. Côte d'Ivoire was scheduled to reach the completion point for debt relief this year under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. As a result of the crisis, this has now slipped until at least 2012. As international sanctions were lifted, economic activity has resumed, with the reopening of banks and businesses. The Government has cleared its debt service arrears to the World Bank and the African Development Bank. The World Bank is preparing a budget support operation of at least $100 million and the African Development Bank has recently approved budget support of some $150 million, while the International Monetary Fund plans to provide a loan amounting to $125 million under its emergency credit facility. In order to reach the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries completion point, the Government will need to revise its strategy regarding the cocoa sector and make progress towards implementing the poverty reduction strategy.

M. Subregional aspects and resumption of the Facilitator's role

49. The pro-Gbagbo mercenaries, militias and former FDS elements in the west pose a serious threat not only to Côte d'Ivoire but also to its neighbours. Most of Côte d'Ivoire's neighbours are vulnerable to destabilization, given the porous borders and the track record of former combatants and militias in the subregion acting as freelance combatants. The President and the Prime Minister have called for a stronger United Nations role in addressing the cross-border movement of mercenaries, armed groups and weapons into Liberia. However, many stakeholders pointed out that the focus should not just be on the Liberian mercenaries because other neighbouring countries were also at risk. A subregional strategy to address this challenge is therefore essential.

50. The role of the subregion will remain critical. President Ouattara has requested the Facilitator to continue to assist the Government in implementing the unfinished aspects of the Ouagadougou Agreements and Prime Minister Soro has written to me, requesting the United Nations to extend support to the Office of the Special Representative of the Facilitator in Abidjan.

N. Safety and security of personnel

51. The safety and security of United Nations personnel has improved since direct attacks on Organization personnel ceased following the apprehension of former President Gbagbo. However, challenges persist, in particular owing to the volatile security situation and the limited capacity of the Ivorian security forces to ensure effective protection of the population and of United Nations personnel.

V. Recommendations of the assessment mission

52. National stakeholders, including the President and the Prime Minister, presented a common view on the nature of assistance they expect the Organization to provide in specific areas, stressing that the continued UNOCI presence and United Nations assistance were essential to stabilize the security situation and rebuild the country.

53. On the basis of the priority areas identified by the Government and requests made by it, and taking into account the role that other partners will play, it is recommended that the United Nations focus on the areas set out below in order to effectively support the Government in addressing the most pressing challenges, with a view to stabilizing the security situation, preventing a relapse into renewed conflict and creating space for the Government to regain lost capacity.

A. Support for efforts to stabilize the security situation

54. It is recommended that UNOCI play a greater role in helping the national authorities to stabilize the security situation, with particular focus on Abidjan and the west, including the border areas. UNOCI will therefore increase joint patrols with FRCI, the police and the gendarmerie, facilitate the resumption of law enforcement responsibilities by the police and the gendarmerie, deter the activities of militias, former FDS personnel, mercenaries and other armed groups, and assist in the protection of civilians. UNOCI will also continue to collect, secure and dispose of weapons, and assist in clearing explosive remnants of war, as appropriate.

55. It is recommended that UNOCI, in close coordination with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), in keeping with Security Council resolutions 1980 (2011) and 1981 (2011), enhance its support to the Ivorian and Liberian authorities to monitor and address cross-border security challenges. UNOCI, in coordination with UNMIL, will increase its presence and patrols in the border areas, in particular "hot spots", conduct a joint assessment of, and share information on, the cross-border movement of armed elements and weapons, and the displacement and abuse of civilian populations, accord priority to providing support for the operations of the national security institutions in the border areas, including through joint patrols with them and capacity-building, and undertake contingency planning together with national authorities. At the same time, a broader subregional strategy is required and I will encourage ECOWAS to develop such a strategy, to which UNOCI and other United Nations presences in the subregion will contribute. The United Nations Office for West Africa should coordinate the actions of the United Nations presences in the subregion to provide support for the development of the subregional strategy.

B. Support for the reconstitution and reform of security and rule of law institutions

56. It is recommended that UNOCI, in coordination with relevant United Nations agencies and bilateral partners, support the Government in reconstituting and reforming the security and rule of law institutions, in particular the armed forces, police, gendarmerie, judiciary and prisons. This would include providing support for a national dialogue process to facilitate the creation of a national security vision, assisting the Government to conduct a sector-wide review of the security institutions and developing a comprehensive national security strategy and plans for their reform, including mechanisms for governance and civilian oversight, as well as developing and implementing a national justice sector strategy. UNOCI, in coordination with the United Nations country team, should also provide training in human rights, child protection and sexual- and gender-based violence for the security and law enforcement forces, offer support with regard to the development of a vetting mechanism for personnel that will be absorbed in the services and promote respect for human rights.

57. It is further recommended that UNOCI, together with the United Nations country team, provide support for the development and implementation of a multi-year joint United Nations justice support programme in order to develop the police, judiciary, prisons and access to justice in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as the initial emergency rehabilitation of relevant infrastructure and the provision of equipment, taking into account the assistance to be provided by other partners in these areas. UNOCI should also provide support for capacity development, including through the provision of specialized training, co-location and mentoring programmes, for the police and gendarmerie, and corrections officers.

58. To ensure effective coordination, transparency and harmonization of efforts, and a clear division of labour among the many partners who are interested in assisting the security sector reform process, it is recommended that the support for such reform be coordinated on the basis of a master plan setting out key tasks and the division of responsibilities, for example through the working group established within the Office of the Prime Minister, and with my Special Representative playing a key role in harmonizing the support provided by international partners. UNOCI should also deploy an expert to work in the Office of the Prime Minister on security sector reform, as requested by the Prime Minister.

C. Support for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, and dismantling of militias

59. UNOCI and the United Nations country team, in close coordination with other international partners, should assist the Government in developing a new national programme for demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of combatants, and dismantling of militias, which is tailored to the new context, builds on lessons learned from the past and takes into account the rights and needs of different categories of persons to be demobilized, including children and women. UNOCI should also continue to support the registration and profiling of former combatants, assist the national authorities to collect and secure weapons, and support the disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed elements. The 1,000 microprojects

initiated by UNOCI and the United Nations Development Programme prior to the elections with voluntary and quick-impact-project funding will continue to provide sustainable alternative livelihoods for some former combatants. It is recommended that the United Nations country team, in consultation with the Government and other interested partners, support the development of a plan to implement such projects as part of the reintegration of former combatants.

D. Support for the collection of weapons from civilian communities

60. UNOCI and the United Nations country team, in coordination with other partners, should support the Government to develop and implement community weapons collection programmes, which should be linked to community violence reduction and reconciliation so as to contribute to community security and social cohesion.

E. Support for the redeployment of State administration and the extension of State authority

61. It is recommended that UNOCI and the United Nations country team reinforce their support to the Ivorian authorities for extending and re-establishing effective State authority, and strengthening public administration and the delivery of public services in key areas throughout the country at the national and local levels, as well as for implementing the unfinished aspects of the Ouagadougou Agreements as they relate to the reunification of the country, which will continue to require the eight seconded customs officers previously authorized by the Security Council.

F. Support for efforts to create a positive political environment and legislative elections

62. UNOCI and the United Nations country team will play an important role in promoting an inclusive political process and supporting the creation of a political environment conducive to the upcoming elections, including by liaising with political parties, monitoring their activities and supporting their development. Specific efforts should be made to enhance women's participation in political life. UNOCI and the United Nations country team should support the organization and conduct of the legislative elections, provide appropriate logistical and technical assistance, and assist the national authorities to put in place effective security arrangements, taking into account the findings of the United Nations electoral needs assessment mission. The certification mandate of my Special Representative should be maintained, with the necessary adjustments to take into account the specificity of legislative elections.

G. Support for efforts to promote national reconciliation and transitional justice

63. UNOCI, in coordination with the United Nations country team, should support the Government in developing a comprehensive transitional justice approach that includes prosecutions, truth-telling, reparations and institutional reforms. It is also

recommended that the United Nations support the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission with a view to ensuring that it will function in accordance with internationally recognized principles and standards. Support should also be provided for community reconciliation, including the establishment and functioning of mechanisms to prevent, mitigate or resolve conflict, in particular at the local level.

H. Support for efforts to promote and protect human rights

64. UNOCI should support the implementation of the recommendations of the International Commission of Inquiry and the strengthening of national human rights institutions and relevant national human rights organizations. It should also continue strengthening its human rights monitoring, investigation and reporting capacity, including public reporting. In this regard, UNOCI and the United Nations country team should ensure more systematic monitoring and reporting on sexual- and gender-based violence, as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1960 (2010). The country team should also assist the Government in finalizing a nationally owned multisectoral strategy for combating sexual- and gender-based violence. The monitoring and reporting mechanism provided for in Council resolution 1612 (2005) should be reactivated.

I. Protection of civilians

65. UNOCI and the United Nations country team continue to work with other partners to assist the national authorities to protect the civilian population through presence, deterrence and, where necessary, direct intervention within their respective mandates, taking into account the specific needs of vulnerable groups. It is further recommended that UNOCI and the country team review the mission's strategy regarding protection of civilians to take into account the new realities on the ground, enhance coordination and include measures to prevent gender-based violence pursuant to resolution 1960 (2010), establish a protection working group and develop specific protection measures, such as early warning systems, joint protection teams and community liaison.

J. Support for the media

66. It is recommended that UNOCI continue to closely monitor the Ivorian media and provide assistance, as appropriate, to media and regulatory bodies, including through the provision of training, with a view to enabling them to play a more constructive role. UNOCI should also continue to use its broadcasting capacity, ONUCI FM, to contribute to the overall effort to create a peaceful environment, including for the legislative elections.

K. Support for efforts to address the humanitarian situation

67. The United Nations country team and UNOCI should further strengthen the provision of humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected and vulnerable populations, and facilitate the transition to recovery by supporting identified national priorities and programmes. To this end, the country team and UNOCI should support the

authorities in developing and implementing a durable solutions strategy for internally displaced persons and refugees, support the implementation of the President's programme d'urgence, especially in relation to basic social services, develop a contingency plan to prepare for the return of displaced persons and support the establishment of a humanitarian inter-ministerial coordination structure.

L. Support for the economic recovery process

68. While the bulk of support to the Government in the area of economic development will be provided by multilateral and bilateral partners, it is recommended that the United Nations system assist the Ivorian authorities to improve development and reconstruction planning by supporting the revision of the poverty reduction strategy and the strategy to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, and by supporting capacity development for planning and aid coordination. The United Nations country team should also support economic revitalization through livelihood and employment generation interventions.

M. Support for subregional efforts

69. It is recommended that UNOCI and the United Nations country team continue to work with the Facilitator and his Special Representative in supporting the implementation of the unfinished aspects of the political process. As requested by the Prime Minister, UNOCI should also provide appropriate logistical support for the Office of the Special Representative of the Facilitator.

VI. Recommendation on the configuration and deployment of UNOCI

70. In light of the continuing security challenges and the impact of the crisis on the national security institutions, it is recommended that the mandate of UNOCI be extended for an additional 12 months. The troop and police strength, configuration and deployment of the mission will be further reviewed after the legislative elections, taking into account the prevailing security situation and progress towards reconstructing the national security and rule of law institutions. Successful legislative elections will be a critical milestone for adjustments to the future role and configuration of UNOCI. Regarding the capacities temporarily redeployed from UNMIL to UNOCI, I submitted the recommendations requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1981 (2011) in a letter dated 10 June to the President of the Council (S/2011/351).

A. Military component

71. The current strength of the military component of UNOCI, as at 20 June, is 8,684 personnel, including 8,402 troops, 186 military observers and 96 staff officers, against an authorized ceiling of 9,792 personnel. Of the additional 2,000 troops authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 1967 (2011), 1,024 troops have deployed and the remainder will deploy shortly.

72. During the crisis, up to five companies and the Force Reserve were redeployed from the north and the east to Abidjan. As the security situation stabilizes in Abidjan and additional troops arrive, these units are returning to their prior locations. UNOCI is reinforcing its troops in the west with deployments to Tabou, Toulépleu and Tai, and reconstituting its Force Reserve, while maintaining the flexibility to execute any further redeployment. In light of the disintegration of the national security and law enforcement services, the military and police components of UNOCI will also have to further reinforce their role in protecting United Nations personnel, facilities and assets, including the mission's protection arrangements for Ivorian stakeholders and key installations. It is recommended that the previously authorized additional 2,400 troops and 100 police be maintained until after the legislative elections.

73. The strength of the Licorne force, which had been increased during the crisis, has since been brought back to 900 troops. They are deployed primarily in the Abidjan area. By its resolutions 1962 (2010) and 1981 (2011), the Security Council had extended its authorization for the Licorne force to provide support to UNOCI, within the limits of the force's deployment and capabilities, until 31 July 2011. The support from the Licorne force remains essential.

B. Police component

74. The current strength of the police component of UNOCI, including reinforcements, as at 20 June, is 1,265 police personnel, composed of 6 formed police units comprising 959 officers and 306 individual police officers, against an authorized ceiling of 1,350 personnel. The police component includes 18 women.

75. In addition to conducting joint patrols with FRCI and being posted in police stations as a confidence-building measure, UNOCI police are providing static security at some key installations and continue to undertake human rights investigations and assist with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operations. In light of the diminished capacity of the Ivorian police and gendarmerie, it is recommended that the Security Council authorize the reconversion of 100 formed police personnel back to individual police officers, as well as the conversion of an additional 120 personnel, while increasing the overall authorized police strength by 205 individual specialists in the areas of crowd control, community policing, judiciary policing, criminal investigation, forensics, sexual- and gender-based violence, organized crime and border management to assist in building the capacity of the Ivorian law enforcement agencies.

VII. Support issues

76. The post-elections crisis required UNOCI to put in place alternative measures in order to ensure an unhindered supply chain, including establishing an alternative logistics base in Bouaké, a new logistics support strategy, a parallel supply chain from Ghana and Burkina Faso, new suppliers and undertaking deliveries through a combination of air and ground transportation, including from other peacekeeping missions. The normalization of the situation allowed UNOCI to reactivate its usual supply chain, while maintaining an alternative logistics base in Bouaké. Looking ahead, the major support challenges will include the redeployment of military and

police personnel to new locations, supporting training activities, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, clearing of explosive remnants of war and logistical support to the legislative elections. These challenges may need to be met through additional resources in most areas, including logistics.

VIII. Financial aspects

77. The proposed budget for UNOCI for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 has been submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration at the second part of its resumed sixty-fifth session. Pending the intended consideration by the Security Council of the assessment and adjustment of the Operation's mandate indicated in paragraphs 18 and 19 of its resolution 1962 (2010) and paragraph 2 of its resolution 1981 (2011), the proposed budget for 2011/12 is based on the deployment of 192 military observers, 7,200 military contingent personnel and 1,250 police personnel (including 800 personnel in formed units). The cost of the various measures proposed in the present report will be advised to the Council as soon as possible. As at 20 June 2011, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNOCI amounted to $53.6 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1,599.3 million. Reimbursement to contributing Governments for troop and formed police costs, and for contingent-owned equipment costs has been made for the period up to 30 April 2011 and 31 December 2010, respectively.

IX. Observations

78. The apprehension of former President Gbagbo closed a painful chapter in the history of Côte d'Ivoire that should never have occurred. The inauguration of President Ouattara represented the culmination of the struggle of the people of Côte d'Ivoire against the attempt to foil their democratically expressed will. I would like to commend the Government and the people of Côte d'Ivoire for their resilience in this regard. I would also like to express my gratitude for the steadfast support and active engagement of the international community, in particular ECOWAS and the African Union, as well as the many individual world leaders who were unwavering in their support for Côte d'Ivoire during a very difficult time.

79. During my visit to Côte d'Ivoire on 21 and 22 May, I was encouraged by the steady progress that is being made by the Government of President Ouattara and the increasing signs of a return to normalcy, albeit gradual. However, the security situation is still extremely precarious and the destroyed national capacity will take some time to recover. The challenges of re-establishing lasting peace and stability are daunting, as the post-elections crisis exacerbated and multiplied old problems, unravelled the progress previously made in the peace process and created new problems. I am concerned about the high risk of a return to armed conflict. The most pressing task is to assist the Government to address the factors that could reignite conflict, as identified in section IV of the present report. The coming 6 to 12 months will be critical in determining whether Côte d'Ivoire will continue on a steady recovery from the crisis or slip back into renewed conflict. I am convinced that the continuing threats to the stability of Côte d'Ivoire and the subregion can be mitigated, but the Government will need strong support, including from the United Nations.

80. While stabilizing the security situation remains the first priority, as a stable security environment creates the space necessary to advance efforts in the other priority areas identified by the President and the Government, establishing sustainable peace and security cannot be limited to security measures alone. It will be equally important to promote reconciliation while addressing impunity and accountability, protect human rights, build strong and independent institutions, ensure inclusive governance, address the root causes of the conflict and promote economic development. Meanwhile, the legislative elections must be held in a timely, inclusive, transparent and credible manner, while the immediate needs of the people are addressed, including enabling the return of those displaced.

81. These immediate challenges notwithstanding, Côte d'Ivoire appears to be on the right track. The President is aware of the heavy responsibilities before him. Moreover, the President and his Government have a clear vision regarding the ways to restore peace and stability, and to rebuild the country so that Côte d'Ivoire will in future reclaim its historic role as the pillar of stability and prosperity in the subregion. The commitment and determination of so many individuals with whom I met during my visit to Côte d'Ivoire to confront the challenges that lie ahead was encouraging. However, it is clear that this will not happen overnight. But it can be accelerated if all Ivorians unite behind a common vision, redouble their efforts in the interest of their country and exercise the necessary patience for these measures to produce tangible change for the better. At the same time, the continuing violence must stop and I call upon the authorities to take appropriate measures in this regard.

82. The crisis has taken a massive toll on Côte d'Ivoire and the country cannot be expected to bounce back swiftly to a level where it is able to contribute significant resources of its own towards addressing the immediate threats and priorities. The country will need our help at this critical time to enable it to get back on its feet. I discussed with President Ouattara when I was in Côte d'Ivoire how the United Nations system can best support his Government and stressed to him the commitment of the Organization to stay the course, provide the support requested by the Ivorian authorities and work closely with all partners to assist the Government in this endeavour in the critical months that lie ahead. The main areas identified for support by the United Nations family are all essential to avert serious setbacks that could reignite renewed conflict.

83. On the basis of the priorities identified by the President and his Government, I recommend that the Security Council endorse the priority areas for the engagement of the United Nations in Côte d'Ivoire, as set out in section V of the present report, and to extend the mandate of UNOCI for one year, with the tasks outlined in sections V and VI. In light of the critical security challenges and the risks that another election will bring to the country, I also recommend that the Council authorize maintaining the strength of the military component of UNOCI at 9,792 personnel, comprising 8,402 troops, 186 military observers and 96 staff officers. With regard to the police, I recommend an increase of 205 individual police officers, with the appropriate language skills, which would bring the authorized levels to 1,555 police officers, comprising 780 formed police unit personnel and 775 individual police officers, as well as the 8 customs officers previously authorized. The military and police strength of the mission will be reviewed after the legislative elections, at which time further adjustments could be recommended that take into account the progress in rebuilding national capacities and the prevailing security challenges.

84. The support of the United Nations alone will not be enough. Strong bilateral and multilateral support will be essential and the regional partners will continue to play an important role. I welcome the continued engagement of the Facilitator, President Compaoré, in support of the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire. I also call upon all international partners to work with the Government and the United Nations in a concerted and cohesive effort in order to maximize our support for the priorities identified by the Government. It will be important to delineate, to the extent possible, the division of labour between UNOCI, the United Nations country team, bilateral and other partners in this regard. At the same time, it is imperative to ensure full national ownership of the peace process and in the process of rebuilding the country.

85. I would like to conclude by expressing my sincere gratitude to my Special Representative, Y. J. Choi, and to the men and women of UNOCI for their courage and dedication in working for a more peaceful and stable Côte d'Ivoire during an especially difficult phase in the country's history. I express my heartfelt and deepest condolences to those who lost their loved ones, colleagues and friends. I would also like to extend my appreciation to the countries contributing troops and police to UNOCI, and to those men and women who put their lives at risk in the performance of their duties. I am particularly grateful to the uniformed personnel in UNOCI and the French Licorne force for their professionalism in carrying out their respective mandates under extremely challenging circumstances. I am also grateful to the United Nations country team, the humanitarian organizations and the multilateral and bilateral donors as well as the multilateral and non-governmental organizations for their important contributions and steadfast commitment. Finally, I would again like to extend my appreciation to ECOWAS, the African Union and the international community in general for maintaining their firm and principled position.

Annex

United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire: military and police strength as at 20 June 2011

	Military component				*Police component*	
Country	*Military observers*	*Staff officers*	*Troops*	***Total***	*Formed police units*	*Civilian police*
Argentina	—	—	—	**—**	—	3
Bangladesh	13	10	2 155	**2 178**	360	—
Benin	8	7	420	**435**	—	31
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	3	—	—	**3**	—	—
Brazil	4	3	—	**7**	—	—
Burundi	—	—	—	**—**	—	24
Cameroon	—	—	—	**—**	—	34
Canada	—	—	—	**—**	—	5
Central African Republic	—	—	—	**—**	—	18
Chad	3	1	—	**4**	—	16
China	6	—	—	**6**	—	—
Djibouti	—	—	—	**—**	—	31
Democratic Republic of the Congo	—	—	—	**—**	—	31
Ecuador	2	—	—	**2**	—	—
Egypt	—	1	175	**176**	—	2
El Salvador	3	—	—	**3**	—	—
Ethiopia	2	—	—	**2**	—	—
France	—	6	—	**6**	—	12
Gambia	1	—	—	**1**	—	—
Ghana	4	8	527	**539**	—	2
Guatemala	5	—	—	**5**	—	—
Guinea	3	—	—	**3**	—	—
India	8	—	—	**8**	—	—
Ireland	2	—	—	**2**	—	—
Jordan	7	12	1 059	**1 078**	449	16
Malawi	—	—	856	**856**	—	—
Morocco	—	3	722	**725**	—	—
Namibia	2	—	—	**2**	—	—
Nepal	3	1	—	**4**	—	—
Niger	7	4	390	**401**	—	31
Nigeria	6	1	—	**7**	—	—
Pakistan	11	12	1 077	**1 100**	150	—
Paraguay	6	2	—	**8**	—	—
Peru	3	—	—	**3**	—	—

Country	Military component				Police component	
	Military observers	Staff officers	Troops	Total	Formed police units	Civilian police
Philippines	3	3	—	**6**	—	—
Poland	3	—	—	**3**	—	—
Republic of Korea	2	—	—	**2**	—	—
Republic of Moldova	4	—	—	**4**	—	—
Romania	6	—	—	**6**	—	—
Russian Federation	8	—	—	**8**	—	—
Senegal	13	7	504	**524**	—	17
Serbia	3	—	—	**3**	—	—
Togo	7	7	517	**531**	—	8
Tunisia	7	4	—	**11**	—	—
Turkey	—	—	—	**—**	—	14
Uganda	2	1	—	**3**	—	—
Ukraine	—	—	—	**—**	—	7
United Republic of Tanzania	1	2	—	**3**	—	—
Uruguay	2	—	—	**2**	—	—
Yemen	8	1	—	**9**	—	4
Zambia	2	—	—	**2**	—	—
Zimbabwe	3	—	—	**3**	—	—
Total	**186**	**96**	**8 402**	**8 684**	**959**	**306**
Number of females	**8**	**3**	**81**	**92**	**—**	**18**


UNOCI
Deployment
June 2011
inter-sector boundary
MALI
BURKINA FASO
GUINEA
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
LIBERIA
GHANA
Sector WEST
Sector EAST
Sector Abidjan
Yamoussoukro
Abidjan
Gulf of Guinea
ATLANTIC OCEAN
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Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa

I. Introduction

1. In its letter dated 20 December 2010 (S/2010/661), the Security Council agreed to extend the mandate of the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) until 31 December 2013 and requested me to report on the implementation of the revised mandate of UNOWA every six months. The present report covers the period from 1 January to 30 June 2011. Taking into account the streamlined mandate of the Office, it provides an overview of national, cross-cutting and cross-border developments in West Africa and outlines the activities undertaken by UNOWA in preventative diplomacy and awareness-raising on emerging threats and challenges to regional peace and stability and its efforts aimed at promoting consultations and synergies at the subregional level, in cooperation with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and other regional and subregional partners, to promote peace and stability.

II. Developments and trends in West Africa

A. Political trends

2. The reporting period witnessed significant progress towards greater stability and peace resulting from, inter alia, the end of the transition processes in Guinea and the Niger and the election-related crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Meanwhile, threats to constitutional order and governance that were noted in my previous reports, such as the increasing trend of unconstitutional changes of Government, seem to be receding. No crisis of that nature was observed during the period under review, and West African democratic prospects continued to be further consolidated. In that regard, it is hoped that the decisive and concerted action undertaken by the international community to bring an end to the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire sent a clear signal to the subregion and beyond. Yet, the possible impact of the recent developments in North Africa on the democratization process in West Africa needs to be evaluated carefully and kept in perspective. Indeed, there are lingering perceptions of the emergence of potentially new political and social crises, which cannot be discounted in West Africa. As in North Africa, such crises could emerge if there is resistance to change and the aspirations of the people of the region, in

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particular the youth, for democratic consolidation and social justice remain unfulfilled, especially during future electoral processes.

3. Despite the relatively positive trends, the overall political situation was marked by a number of election-related crises. Although important improvements in the organization and conduct of electoral processes have been achieved in the recent past, election-related tensions and violence remain a source of concern in the region. The polarizing nature of party politics and the relatively weak national institutions which had not always forged consensus on the management of electoral bodies and procedures, which were observed in a number of countries, continued to threaten stability in the subregion.

4. Nine elections have been held across West Africa since my previous report (S/2010/614). Parliamentary and presidential elections were held in Benin, the Niger and Nigeria, while parliamentary elections were held in Cape Verde. The Governments of the Niger and Nigeria also organized local elections. International observers noted improvements in the conduct and management of elections and reported relatively few irregularities compared with past electoral processes. However, a number of electoral aspects, including voter registration and the release of results, remain highly contentious and constitute important potential triggers of violence. As a result, the subregion has continued to witness tensions between political parties, which in some instances resulted in deadly confrontations between security forces and activists.

B. Economic, social and humanitarian trends

5. The economic situation of the subregion presents a mixed picture. As in other parts of the continent, there are indications that West African countries would benefit from renewed international growth, albeit at a rate lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa.

6. With regard to the Millennium Development Goals, recent data show that several countries of the region have fallen behind the targets, particularly in relation to poverty reduction, owing to a number of factors, including endemic and rising unemployment and the effects of continued soaring food and energy prices. Furthermore, the continued rise in food and fuel prices contributed to the deterioration of the living conditions of large segments of the population, thereby constituting a potential threat to the stability of the States concerned. Economic performance in the long term may therefore be largely determined by the degree of political stability in the subregion.

7. Instability in Côte d'Ivoire and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya have had a particularly great impact on food security, especially in the countries of West Africa that had already been severely affected by the consequences of the food and pastoral crisis in 2010. The influx of displaced populations is exacerbating that situation; this is especially the case for Liberia, where Ivorian refugees are hosted, and for the northern regions of Mali and the Niger. The crisis in Côte d'Ivoire also had an impact on economic migration from neighbouring countries, mainly Burkina Faso (with an estimated 200,000 returnees and third-country nationals), Mali (with an estimated 150,000 returnees and third-country nationals), Guinea (with an estimated 50,000 returnees and third-country nationals) and the Niger, which prevented affected households from receiving their usual remittances and thereby decreased

their income. In addition to the influx of refugees and returnees from Côte d'Ivoire, the Governments of Mali and the Niger are also coping with the return of migrant workers from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. In Mali, the number of returnees reached 10,238, while there were 100,000 returnees in the Niger. The present crisis in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is likely to have a further adverse impact on local livelihoods in West Africa, especially in Mali and the Niger, as a result of the significant drop of the remittance inflow from migrant workers.

C. Security trends, including drug trafficking and organized crime

8. The weak rule of law and high levels of poverty in a number of West African countries contributed to incidents of organized crime. Some of those countries serve as transit points for large-scale trafficking of cocaine from Latin America towards European and North American markets. While preliminary findings of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) indicate a decline in the number of seizures related to maritime cargo and flights from West Africa to Europe, there are indications that traffickers have modified their techniques and found new ways of sending cocaine to Europe, including through West Africa, which have not yet been detected. Available data show that heroin trafficking through West Africa increased in the first five months of 2011. During the reporting period, the trend regarding the production in West Africa and trafficking to Asia of methamphetamine was confirmed. Money-laundering, particularly from drug trafficking, also continues to be a source of major concern in the subregion. Its corrupting effects have further weakened already fragile State institutions and may finance armed or terrorist groups operating across West Africa and the Sahel.

9. Insecurity in the Sahel region has increased significantly, including terrorist attacks against national armed forces and the kidnapping of foreigners. The nature of the insecurity has evolved from attacks against individuals to actions against State institutions. The sophistication shown in the conduct of operations reflects an increase in the operational capacities of terrorist groups. However, Sahelian States lack the resources necessary to address terrorist and criminal threats effectively and guarantee a safe environment for their populations.

10. Growing insecurity, a deteriorating humanitarian situation and concerns about the cross-border impact of the Libyan crisis have triggered a renewed political drive to increase regional cooperation to stabilize the Sahel area. Consultations have intensified among the Governments of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger in order to bolster regional cooperation in the field of security and ensure economic and social development in the border areas, as well as to improve the well-being of the local population and ultimately address the root causes of insecurity.

11. Renewed diplomatic contacts and improvement in the relations between Algeria and Mali were observed following the visit of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali, Soumeylou Maiga, to Algiers on 27 April. That visit was followed by the decision of the Government of Algeria, announced on 28 April, to allocate $10 million in emergency funds to finance development projects in northern Mali in support of efforts to combat extremist groups in the area. A special meeting of the joint chiefs of staff of the armies of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger was held in Bamako on 29 April. This meeting signalled an important step towards the operationalization of the Joint Operational Chiefs of Staff Committee, which was

established to fight terrorism in the Sahel band at a meeting held in Tamanrasset, Algeria, in August 2009. During the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger, held on 20 May in Bamako, the four countries agreed to meet every six months in order to expand their dialogue on issues related to the development of the border areas and to facilitate regional integration. They also decided that the Government of Algeria would host a regional summit on security and development, to which international partners would be invited.

D. Trends on human rights and gender issues

12. During the reporting period, fundamental freedoms such as the freedom of speech, expression and assembly further improved in many countries of the subregion. There have also been significant efforts to promote the equal participation of men and women in public affairs in some countries, including in Mali, with the appointment of its first female Prime Minister, Benin, Cape Verde, Guinea and Senegal, among others, and to implement Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008). However, the failure to apply a human rights-based approach throughout tense electoral processes and volatile political environments has led to violence, post-electoral tensions and human rights violations in several West African countries. In particular, the resurgence of police brutality; extrajudicial killing of civilian populations by armed elements, especially in the context of repression of civil unrest; house burning; ethnic and religious violence; forced displacement; and violence against women and children represented important setbacks in some countries of the subregion.

III. Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa

A. Carry out good offices and special assignments for conflict prevention

13. During the period under review, the UNOWA good offices concentrated both on managing election-related crises and on ensuring the return to civilian rule and constitutional order. Those efforts focused more specifically on Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and the Niger.

Benin

14. The presidential elections, initially scheduled for 27 February, were postponed to 6 March owing to delays in the electoral process, in particular the finalization of the permanent computerized voters list. Along with ECOWAS and the African Union, my Special Representative carried out a good offices mission on 3 March with a view to defusing tensions. National stakeholders, including former Presidents Zinsou, Soglo and Kérékou, had previously initiated discussions with presidential candidates in an attempt to resolve the impasse related to the electoral process, in particular the voters list. The ECOWAS/African Union/United Nations joint delegation encouraged national stakeholders to find consensual solutions to the pending challenges related to the holding of the elections in order to preserve peace, security and stability and consolidate the democratic achievements of Benin.

Following consultations with the opposition, the delegation suggested a postponement for a few days of the presidential elections without violating the principles of the Constitution.

15. Following the joint ECOWAS/African Union/United Nations mission to Benin on 3 March, the Constitutional Court authorized the postponement of the presidential elections to 13 March. In the meantime, the Parliament adopted a law authorizing the revision of the voters list. Despite the mistrust that had emerged during the preparatory phase between the political stakeholders, the election took place on 13 March under peaceful conditions. The ECOWAS and African Union observers certified the election as generally free and transparent despite some shortcomings in the process.

16. Before the release of the provisional results, which gave 53 per cent of the votes to President Yayi Boni and 35 per cent to Adrien Houngbédji, both the ruling party and the main opposition coalition claimed victory, thus generating tensions, which resulted in isolated incidents. Amid calls by national stakeholders for calm, President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, Chair of ECOWAS, travelled to Benin and stressed the need for a violence-free electoral process. The ECOWAS Commission also issued a statement appealing to all presidential candidates and their followers to abide by the results of the election. At the end of the thirty-ninth ECOWAS ordinary summit in Abuja on 24 March, the Heads of State and Government called on the candidates to respect the final results to be announced by the Constitutional Court.

17. On 29 March, the Constitutional Court rejected the appeals and proclaimed the re-election of President Yayi Boni. My Special Representative attended the swearing-in ceremony, which was held on 6 April. Legislative elections took place under peaceful conditions on 30 April. The electoral process thus ended with the inauguration ceremony of the sixth legislature on 16 May.

Côte d'Ivoire

18. As part of the United Nations efforts to assist in finding a peaceful solution to the post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, I maintained close contact with key African leaders to encourage them in their efforts to secure a peaceful outcome to the crisis. My sole objective was to ensure that the democratically expressed will of the Ivorian people was respected. As part of the United Nations efforts to consult with our African partners, I dispatched my Special Representative for West Africa, accompanied by my Principal Deputy Special Representative for Côte d'Ivoire, on a special assignment to Angola, Burkina Faso, the Gambia, Ghana, Mali and South Africa from 18 to 25 January. During the consultations, held at the highest levels, my Special Representative further explained and clarified the role of the United Nations in the elections in Côte d'Ivoire, especially with respect to the certification process. He also emphasized the importance of maintaining cohesion within the international community, particularly among ECOWAS, the African Union and the United Nations, on the basis of the agreed principled positions adopted by the organizations.

19. At a meeting held on 28 January in Addis Ababa on the margins of the African Union Summit, the African Union Peace and Security Council decided to establish a high-level panel, supported by a team of experts, to propose a political solution to the crisis, based on the relevant decisions taken by the African Union and ECOWAS. As agreed upon with the African Union, my Special Representative for

West Africa cooperated closely with the African Union and contributed to the work of the team of experts and of the high-level panel. It was in that context that my Special Representative participated in the successive meetings of the team of experts and the high-level panel, held in Abidjan (8 and 9 February), Addis Ababa (17 February and 9 March) and Nouakchott (19 and 20 February and 4 March). That contribution was recognized by the African Union Peace and Security Council in its communiqué issued following its 225th meeting, held on 10 March.

Guinea

20. The people of Guinea eventually succeeded in conducting their presidential polls with significant support from the international community. The first President elected democratically since the independence of Guinea, Alpha Condé, was sworn in on 21 December 2010. During his investiture ceremony, attended by the Deputy Secretary-General, President Condé highlighted his commitment to tackling the numerous challenges faced by Guinea, including improving the economy, providing employment opportunities and promoting the rule of law, good governance and national reconciliation. The President also committed to reforming the security sector, which would result in restoring people's trust in the defence and security forces.

21. Following the establishment of a new Government, the International Contact Group on Guinea, in which the United Nations was represented by my Special Representative, met for the final time on 10 February. Participants agreed on the need to establish a Group of Friends on Guinea, which would follow up on the initiatives undertaken by the International Contact Group. While acknowledging the substantial support received from the international community in relation to the transition process, Prime Minister Mohamed Said Fofana expressed the hope that international support would remain strong even after the end of the transition period in order to consolidate the democratic process, build institutions and promote economic growth and development.

22. At the request of the Government, Guinea was officially added to the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission on 23 February. My Special Representative met with the Chair of the Guinea configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas of Luxembourg, during the latter's first visit to Guinea from 3 to 10 April. During the visit, the Chair noted a broad consensus among national and international stakeholders that the three priority areas identified by the Government of Guinea: national reconciliation, the reform of the security sector and youth and women's employment, were both relevant and urgent. The Chair also took note of the need to continue to consolidate democracy in Guinea and stated that the upcoming parliamentary elections were a critical step in that direction, along with the need to sustain dialogue between the Government and all political stakeholders, improve governance and boost the economy.

The Niger

23. The reporting period witnessed the successful conclusion of the transition process in the Niger and the country's return to constitutional order a year after former President Mamadou Tandja was ousted from power. Indeed, the holding of peaceful legislative and presidential elections on 31 January, followed by the run-off of the presidential elections on 12 March, signalled the effective implementation of

the timetable set by the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD) led by Lieutenant-General Salou Djibo.

24. As part of continued United Nations efforts aimed at ensuring a smooth transition, my Special Representative, together with the President of the ECOWAS Commission and the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, travelled to Niamey on 13 and 14 January, prior to the parliamentary elections and the first round of the presidential elections. On that occasion, they held discussions with national and international stakeholders, including Lieutenant-General Djibo, Prime Minister Mahamadou Danda and several presidential candidates, with a view to impressing on all parties the need to respect the agreed schedule of the transition process and ensure that the legislative and presidential elections took place in the best possible conditions.

25. Out of 10 candidates who contested the first round of the presidential elections on 31 January, 2 candidates emerged as the front runners: Seini Oumarou of the National Movement for the Society of Development (MNSD) and Mahamadou Issoufou of the Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS). The second round was held as planned on 12 March. Mr. Issoufou was elected President of the Republic with 58 per cent of the votes for a five-year term. His contender, Mr. Oumarou, received 42 per cent of the votes. Observers from ECOWAS, the African Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the European Union commended the smooth and orderly conduct of the polls. They declared that the elections had been conducted in a free, fair and transparent manner.

26. I wish to commend the conduct of the people of the Niger during the election. Indeed, as Mr. Issoufou had declared, the people of the Niger had shown great political maturity. Similarly, CSRD should be commended for its conduct in overseeing a successful transition and free and fair elections. It is worth noting that on 16 March, Mr. Oumarou announced that he had accepted the results, congratulated President Issoufou and wished him success in governing the country. I took note of the fact that all the leaders of the country had stressed the importance of national reconciliation. Equally important, the handover between CSRD and President Issoufou proceeded smoothly. Soon after the conclusion of the electoral process and in the spirit of reconciliation, Lieutenant-General Djibo, President Issoufou and Mr. Oumarou travelled together to Abuja to attend the ECOWAS Summit, held on 23 and 24 March.

27. My Special Representative represented me at the swearing-in ceremony of President Issoufou, which took place in Niamey on 7 April. On that occasion, President Issoufou solemnly vowed to respect and defend the Constitution that the people of the Niger had freely given themselves, faithfully perform the high duties that the nation had assigned to him, not be guided by partisan interests and respect human rights. He also pledged to devote all his forces to the search for and the promotion of the common good, peace and national unity and to preserve the integrity of the national territory. President Issoufou also outlined the main priorities of his mandate, which included reducing hunger, alleviating poverty and fighting corruption and insecurity. He also pledged to allocate one quarter of the State budget to improving the education system. On 10 May, the Court of Appeals of the Niger cleared former President Tandja, who had been under house arrest since February 2010, of corruption charges and ordered his release from jail.

Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

28. The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, of which my Special Representative serves as Chair, continued to show progress towards the implementation of the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 10 October 2002. At its 27th session, held in Yaoundé on 10 and 11 March, the parties expressed a wish to assume stronger ownership over the process and challenged themselves to complete the substantial part of the demarcation work by November 2012, including the construction of another 1,056 boundary pillars. They also agreed on a new structure that would give them a leading role in the management of future demarcation works. Furthermore, the parties agreed to carry out joint sensitization missions, accompanied by the United Nations, to facilitate acceptance of the demarcation by local communities. On 17 May, surveyors began to assess some of the most inaccessible areas of the land boundary. To date, out of the estimated 1,950 kilometres, 1,600 kilometres have been formally agreed upon. Cameroon and Nigeria have also acknowledged that the Working Group on the Maritime Boundary had fulfilled its mandate, ending the implementation of the ruling of the International Court of Justice in respect of the maritime boundary.

29. The Follow-up Committee on the implementation of the Greentree Agreement of 12 June 2006 regarding the withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Bakassi peninsula met in Geneva on 24 February and on 5 and 6 May. The parties acknowledged during both meetings that a peaceful atmosphere generally prevailed in the zone of Bakassi and that the conditions in the area had gradually improved amid efforts by the two countries to initiate joint security patrols and enhance transboundary security in the area, as assessed during the field visits by the joint observers group.

30. My Special Representative continued to work with the United Nations country teams of Cameroon and Nigeria in order to pursue an integrated approach towards supporting the establishment of confidence-building measures and joint economic programmes for the benefit of the populations living along the boundary. To that end, the Government of Cameroon, along with representatives of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Population Fund, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), the World Food Programme and the World Health Organization undertook a needs assessment mission in the border area in May and June 2011. A similar exercise is expected to be conducted soon in Nigeria.

B. Enhancing subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security

Elections and stability

31. As election-related tensions and violence continue to be a source of concern in the subregion, UNOWA convened a high-level regional conference on elections and stability in Praia from 18 to 20 May. The initiative built upon the process launched during a regional workshop on the role of security institutions in electoral processes

organized by UNOWA and held in November 2008 in Conakry, during which the need for a holistic approach to elections had been emphasized. The main objectives of the Praia conference were to draw lessons from electoral processes and to analyse their implications for crisis prevention and peacebuilding in West Africa. The conference was hosted by the Government of Cape Verde and organized in partnership with the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and the UNDP Regional Office for West Africa. It received the support of ECOWAS, the African Union, the International Organization of la Francophonie, the European Union and the International Peace Institute. Participants included high-level representatives of Governments of the subregion and international and regional organizations, as well as election management bodies, national security forces, civil society, academic institutions and the media.

32. The conference adopted the Praia Declaration on Elections and Stability in West Africa, which stressed, inter alia, the need for continuing efforts to harmonize the normative and institutional arrangements governing elections at the regional level. The Declaration also underlined the need to promote human rights and gender in the administration of electoral processes and advocated for strengthening national legal frameworks in relation to the role of security forces and the media in elections. The participants committed to working together for the implementation of the recommendations set out in the Praia Declaration.

33. The outcome of the regional conference was three-pronged: (a) the United Nations and its regional partners assessed electoral best practices and norms, including the implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance adopted in 2001; (b) a set of policy recommendations was developed on critical issues such as the financing of elections, the functioning of the electoral commissions, the role of the media and of the security sector, and human rights and gender issues; and (c) subregional capacities were assessed with a view to addressing potential election-related challenges.

Security sector reform

34. During the reporting period, UNOWA, while continuing to cooperate closely with ECOWAS in the context of the implementation of its political framework and its plan of action on security sector governance and reform, specifically focused its efforts on supporting the security sector reform process in Guinea, at the request of President Condé. Following consultations with ECOWAS and the African Union, the former head of the joint ECOWAS/African Union/United Nations security sector assessment mission, General Lamine Cissé, was dispatched to Guinea from 20 to 24 January to discuss possible next steps with the Government in the implementation of the reform. Following the visit, the authorities decided to hold a national seminar on security sector reform and to establish a national technical committee within the Ministry of Defence to act as focal point for the planning and organization of the security sector reform implementation phase, including the preparation of the seminar.

35. The national seminar on security sector reform, organized by the Government of Guinea with the support of the United Nations, was held in Conakry from 28 to 31 March. President Condé opened the seminar. UNOWA worked closely with the United Nations Resident Coordinator, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

of the United Nations Secretariat and the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery to ensure a coherent approach by the United Nations. The United Nations provided advisory assistance to the technical committee before and during the holding of the seminar, including through the deployment of an international security sector reform expert by the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery in February and of two security sector reform experts by UNOWA with resources from the Department of Political Affairs from 13 March to 6 April.

36. The seminar provided the opportunity for the first official national dialogue on security sector reform among representatives of the security and defence sector, the Government and civil society organizations in Guinea. On that occasion, participants reviewed the progress achieved regarding the preliminary implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the joint African Union/ECOWAS/United Nations security sector assessment mission conducted in 2010. They also initiated discussions on the development of a national road map to ensure implementation of the recommendations. The seminar also served as a platform for identifying national capacities and areas in which Guinea would require assistance from its international partners. The seminar resulted in the establishment of a national steering committee on security sector reform. While the authorities are working towards the finalization of the road map for the implementation of security sector reform, bilateral and multilateral partners such as France, the United States of America and the European Union are supporting concrete quick-impact activities on the ground. The United Nations has also established modalities to ensure the overall coordination of international efforts in support of the Government-led process.

Drug trafficking and cross-border organized crime

37. Since my previous report, the United Nations, working in tandem with regional partners, mobilized additional support for and facilitated the implementation of the ECOWAS regional action plan to address the growing problem of illicit drug trafficking, organized crime and drug abuse in West Africa. In parallel, specific activities were devised to operationalize the West Africa Coast Initiative, a joint initiative undertaken by UNOWA/Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNODC and INTERPOL, which aimed at building capacity in support of the ECOWAS regional action plan.

38. To that end, my Special Representative developed and strengthened partnerships with a number of institutions. He held discussions with the European Union in Brussels on 31 March and participated in the ministerial meeting on transatlantic drug trafficking of the 2011 Group of Eight Summit, held in Paris on 10 May. The ministerial meeting adopted a political declaration and a plan of action aimed at reinforcing transatlantic cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking, particularly among the three most affected regions, Latin America, West Africa and Europe. On that occasion, both the Executive Director of UNODC and my Special Representative sought support for the West Africa Coast Initiative as part of the wider international strategy to fight against drug trafficking.

39. UNOWA, UNODC, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and INTERPOL continued the implementation of the West Africa Coast Initiative in Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone; its implementation in Côte d'Ivoire was suspended owing to the crisis there. In Sierra Leone, a Transnational Organized Crime Unit was established and equipped and is now operational. The unit has

already been involved in an investigation of marijuana trafficking, which led to the seizure of a large quantity of marijuana by the Police on 16 May. The Transnational Crime Unit in Guinea-Bissau, became operational through the appointment of personnel and the provision of premises in April 2011. In Liberia, the Minister of Justice endorsed the memorandum of understanding for the establishment of the Transnational Crime Unit on 20 May 2011.

40. Emphasis was also placed on consolidating the strategic orientation of the West Africa Coast Initiative programme. On 22 February, the four partners that constitute the Initiative approved the internal three-tier steering and coordination mechanism, including the High-level Policy Committee, which was established to provide strategic coordination, direction and guidance to the overall programme. The inaugural Policy Committee meeting took place in Dakar on 20 June with my Special Representative serving as its Chair. The objectives of the meeting were to maintain coherence between the ECOWAS action plan and the West Africa Coast Initiative Freetown Commitment on Combating Illicit Trafficking of Drugs and Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa; oversee at the strategic level the political, organizational and financial aspects of the Initiative's implementation; support strategic collaboration and cooperation among the various national, regional and international actors; and undertake resource mobilization efforts with a view to supporting the implementation of the Initiative. The Policy Committee welcomed the commitment of countries in West Africa to fighting transnational organized crime and praised the collaboration which was established between the Initiative and ECOWAS. It agreed to continue supporting the ECOWAS regional action plan to address the growing threat of illicit drug trafficking, organized crime and drug abuse in West Africa. After reviewing the progress achieved and challenges faced in the implementation of the Initiative in the four pilot countries, the Policy Committee also decided to send a technical mission to Côte d'Ivoire and to call for a donor conference to support concrete activities, to be funded by a West Africa Coast Initiative basket fund under UNODC management. The Policy Committee also considered expanding the Initiative's activities to Guinea, subsequent to the decision of the partner agencies to include Guinea in the Initiative. To that end, it decided to dispatch a special technical and needs assessment mission to Guinea and to invite the Government of Guinea to attend the next meeting of the Policy Committee.

C. Promotion of good governance, the rule of law, human rights and gender mainstreaming

41. With regard to the promotion of human rights and gender mainstreaming in peace and security-related activities, UNOWA benefited from its strengthened partnership with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, pan-African institutions and civil society organizations. As part of the United Nations efforts to fight impunity, my Special Representative visited Guinea with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on 14 and 15 March. On that occasion, they encouraged the Guinean authorities to establish a truth, justice and reconciliation commission and an independent national human rights institution. A presidential decree established the institution on 17 March.

42. The sixth consultative meeting of Heads of United Nations human rights offices in West Africa was hosted by UNOWA on 16 and 17 March. The High Commissioner attended the meeting, which focused on human rights in electoral

processes, the fight against impunity and gender and human rights. Considering the volatile security situation in several countries of the region, the participants agreed to include the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1612 (2005) and 1882 (2009) in joint human rights activities in the subregion. The meeting also allowed for an enhanced partnership among ECOWAS, UNOWA and UN-Women in support of the implementation of the ECOWAS regional plan on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and the United Nations Campaign to End Violence against Women.

43. UNOWA facilitated the activities of the Working Group on Women, Peace and Security in West Africa in the framework of the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008) through monthly meetings which aimed at enhancing the stakeholders' capacities in mainstreaming gender, in particular in peace and security strategies. UNOWA also published the 2011 edition of the directory of institutions working for peace and security in West Africa, an initiative of the Working Group on Women, Peace and Security in West Africa. That action was meant to further improve synergies and harmonize actions of cross-sector actors, institutions, organizations and agencies working directly or indirectly to facilitate sustainable peace and security in the West African region.

44. In collaboration with ECOWAS and in partnership with the Government of Guinea, UNOWA organized a partners' round table on 15 April in Conakry on progress achieved and challenges encountered in the implementation process of Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008) in the 16 countries of the subregion. The event brought together 130 high-level participants, and the opening ceremony was addressed by President Condé. The Governments of Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone had already launched their national action plans, while the Gambia, Ghana and Nigeria were in the process of developing their respective plans. The round table resulted in the launching of a resource mobilization strategy for the implementation of the regional plan of action on Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008). Participants undertook to provide technical and financial support for the implementation of the plan of action at both the country and subregional levels.

D. Inter-institutional cooperation

United Nations inter-institutional cooperation

45. As previously indicated, a number of joint initiatives were undertaken with United Nations peace missions, agencies, funds and programmes based in West Africa, as well as with the Peacebuilding Commission and OHCHR. Those initiatives included activities related to security sector reform, election-related violence, human rights and gender and the work of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission.

46. In addition, the two meetings of the heads of the United Nations peace missions in West Africa, held in Dakar on 28 February and 28 May respectively, provided a framework for further harmonization of United Nations action for the promotion of stability in the subregion. On 28 February, the heads of mission in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia met and discussed the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire and its impact on the subregion, in particular on the cross-border implications on Liberia. The heads of mission also discussed a number of cross-

cutting issues affecting peace and stability in the region and agreed to strengthen collaboration, especially with regard to elections, the fight against drug trafficking and security sector reform.

47. On 28 May, the heads of mission in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone noted with satisfaction the positive developments in West Africa since their previous meeting. They noted in particular the end of the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire and the successful holding of democratic elections in Benin, the Niger and Nigeria, the promising perspective of peaceful, free and fair elections to be organized in Cape Verde and Liberia before the end of the year and the revitalization of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the fight against insecurity in the Sahel. Aware that the West African subregion remained fragile despite these positive developments, the heads of mission resolved to be vigilant and to maintain close contacts among their respective missions, especially on cross-border and cross-cutting issues, including within the framework of the Policy Committee of the West Africa Coast Initiative.

48. My Special Representative also convened the eighth meeting of the regional directors and heads of United Nations agencies based in Dakar. They reviewed developments in the subregion and the role of the United Nations in that context, with a special focus on Guinea, the Niger, Benin, Burkina Faso and Senegal. They also discussed the humanitarian impact of the crises in Côte d'Ivoire and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya potential election-related instability, as most countries in the subregion are scheduled to hold elections within the period from 2011 to 2013.

Cooperation with regional and subregional partners

49. In addition to good offices activities undertaken jointly with ECOWAS during the period under review, my Special Representative participated in the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Authority of the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, which was held on 23 and 24 March 2011 in Abuja. The thirty-ninth ordinary session provided an opportunity to exchange on ongoing cooperation initiatives between the two institutions, including with regard to Côte d'Ivoire, joint good offices efforts and the organization of a high-level regional conference on elections and stability in Praia from 18 to 20 May. It should be noted, however, that as a result of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, which drained ECOWAS resources and attention, a number of joint technical initiatives between the two institutions could not take place as planned.

IV. Observations and recommendations

50. The presidential election in Guinea and the subsequent inauguration of the first democratically elected President provides an opportunity for the country to address long-standing challenges to peace and security, including national reconciliation, human rights violations and political and socio-economic governance. It also provides an opportunity for the country to deliver tangible dividends to its people. I commend President Condé for his commitment to addressing the most pressing issues and encourage him to engage in constructive dialogue with all national stakeholders in order to overcome social and political tensions while consolidating the gains achieved so far.

51. I am encouraged by the important steps taken by the new Guinean authorities to accelerate the implementation of security sector reform on the basis of the joint assessment conducted in 2010 by the United Nations, ECOWAS and the African Union. The United Nations will continue its efforts to respond to the country's call for improved coordination of the international activities and programmes on security sector reform. Given that governance of the security sector is at the heart of State reconstruction and the consolidation of public institutions in several West African countries, I take this opportunity to encourage ECOWAS to finalize and adopt the subregional political framework and plan of action on security sector governance and reform currently under discussion. UNOWA stands ready to assist in this process, if needed.

52. With the inauguration of Mr. Issoufou as President of the Niger on 7 April, the Niger successfully returned to constitutional and civilian rule a little over a year following the overthrow of former President Tandja. I commend the work of the transitional authorities, and in particular Lieutenant-General Djibo. I welcome this new democratic dispensation even as I am sure the new authorities of the Niger will continue to need sustained support from the international community to effectively advance the well-being, development and security of the people of the Niger as well as to strengthen the country's democratic institutions.

53. I cannot fail to acknowledge the modest progress achieved by the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission and the commitment displayed by both Cameroon and Nigeria during their seventeenth session to meeting the challenge of completing the demarcation of the boundary between the two countries. I also congratulate the parties for their commitment to accelerating the implementation of the ruling of the International Court of Justice. I look forward to the conclusion of those processes within the time frame allocated. I know that there are difficult decisions that lie ahead but I have never doubted the political will of both countries to accomplish the task at hand.

54. I also welcome the adoption of the Praia Declaration on Elections and Stability in West Africa, which was endorsed during the regional conference held in Praia from 18 to 20 May. I urge all relevant actors in the region, in particular ECOWAS, its member States and civil society in West Africa, to work closely with the United Nations system in order to implement its recommendations effectively. I wish once again to reassure the leaders of the region that, as part of the United Nations commitment to consolidating democracy in West Africa, UNOWA will continue to encourage and actively support these efforts.

55. While I acknowledge the progress made in the fight against transnational organized crime, including illicit drug trafficking in West Africa, in particular through the West Africa Coast Initiative, I once again wish to stress the need for the countries of the subregion to consolidate the strategic direction and to strengthen regional ownership on that matter. I also urge partners to provide the required financial support to the Initiative and to the ECOWAS regional action plan.

56. With respect to the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, many stakeholders have called for a stronger role of the United Nations in addressing the recent return of mercenaries and other cross-border illegal movements, including of weapons, from Côte d'Ivoire into Liberia and other neighbouring countries. A subregional strategy to address this challenge, with the support of UNOWA, is therefore essential.

57. There have been some indications that weapons have been transferred from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and fallen into the hands of terrorists in the Sahel band, risking destabilizing the whole region, which continues to be threatened by terrorist activities. Another potential source of instability is the significant drop of the remittance inflow from migrant workers, which will put a strain on local livelihoods. In order to address those persisting and emerging humanitarian and security challenges, Sahel countries should strengthen their collaboration. In that regard, I am encouraged by the strengthened cooperation among the Governments of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger. I welcome the current momentum and the calls for a summit on security and development in the Sahel band. My Special Representative will continue to mobilize the United Nations system in support of this initiative as well as to accompany any possible outcome of the proposed conference.

58. The steps taken by West African States to operationalize the regional plan of action on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008) are encouraging. I also welcome the support given by partners to the regional action plan and the adoption of national action plans by an increasing number of countries in the subregion. I encourage all the Governments of the subregion to develop and adopt similar plans. The United Nations, in particular UN-Women, stands ready to provide assistance in this respect.

59. The administration of an effective and impartial justice system represent a major challenge in West Africa, not only in the context of the efforts by Governments to promote good governance and the rule of law, but also in terms of preventing conflicts and creating the conditions for sustainable peace and security. In order to assist the countries of the region to overcome those challenges, UNOWA and the West Africa Regional Office of OHCHR intend to organize a regional conference on impunity by the end of 2011 in order to mobilize and engage regional partners to advance the fight against impunity. The conference will also seek to establish a road map to assist in the effective implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.

60. With the end of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, the restoration of constitutional order and democracy in Guinea and the Niger and peaceful and fair elections in Benin and Nigeria, the subregion is witnessing a new momentum towards peace and democracy, with the strong support of United Nations entities present in the field, including UNOWA. While paving the way for stability, reconstruction and development, those encouraging achievements have regrettably not completely reversed the potential of new rounds of instability, which remain a reality in several countries, as illustrated by recent developments in Burkina Faso and the simmering tensions observed in other countries of the subregion. UNOWA will continue to support initiatives aimed at consolidating those gains that are consistent with its revised mandate endorsed by the Security Council in December 2010. The Office will also concentrate its activities on addressing cross-border and cross-cutting challenges to peace, human security and stability, in particular election-related crisis and violence, challenges related to security sector reform and transnational criminality, notably drug trafficking and terrorism.

61. In conclusion, I wish to reiterate my appreciation to the Governments in West Africa and to the ECOWAS Commission, as well as to other subregional and regional institutions, for closely cooperating with UNOWA. I would also like to

extend my gratitude to the various entities of the United Nations system active in West Africa, including the heads of peace missions, the heads of United Nations regional offices, country teams and other relevant entities for their dedication and support to UNOWA. Finally, I would like to thank my Special Representative, Said Djinnit, and the staff of UNOWA and the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission for their tireless efforts to promote sustainable peace and security in West Africa.

United Nations S/2011/389

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 June 2011

Original: English

Colombia, Gabon, Nigeria, South Africa and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and its presidential statements on the situation in Sudan, and noting the priority it attaches to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,

Reaffirming its commitment to the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity; and to peace, stability and security throughout the region,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 1882 (2009) on children in armed conflict, 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, and 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), and 1889 (2009) on women peace and security,

Welcoming the Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area reached on 20 June 2011 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,

Commending the assistance provided to the parties by the African Union High Level Implementation Panel and its chair President Thabo Mbeki, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Haile Menkerios,

Noting the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement's request for the assistance of the Government of Ethiopia with regard to this matter,

Noting the readiness of the United Nations and the international community to assist the parties in establishing and implementing mutual security arrangements in support of the objectives of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,

Bearing in mind the importance of coherence of UN assistance in the region,

Deeply concerned by the current situation in the Abyei Area, and by all acts of violence committed against civilians in violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law including the killing and displacement of significant number of civilians,

Reaffirming the importance of full and urgent implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by both parties,

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Calling on all parties involved to provide humanitarian personnel with full and unimpeded access to civilians in need of assistance and all necessary facilities for their operations, in accordance with international humanitarian law,

Urging all parties to facilitate the rapid return of internally displaced persons,

Noting the intent of the parties to establish a special unit of the Abyei Police Service which shall deal with particular issues related to nomadic migration,

Welcoming and encouraging efforts by the United Nations to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases in all of its peacekeeping operations,

Calling upon all parties to engage constructively in negotiations towards the final agreement on the status of Abyei,

Recognizing that the current situation in Abyei demands an urgent response and constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to establish, for a period of 6 months, the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), taking into account the Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area, and *further decides* that UNISFA shall comprise a maximum of 4200 military personnel, 50 police personnel, and appropriate civilian support;

2. *Decides* that UNISFA shall have the following mandate, in addition to tasks set out in paragraph 3:

(a) Monitor and verify the redeployment of any Sudan Armed Forces, Sudan People's Liberation Army or its successor, from the Abyei Area as defined by the Permanent Court of Arbitration; henceforth, the Abyei Area shall be demilitarized from any forces other than UNISFA and the Abyei Police Service;

(b) Participate in relevant Abyei Area bodies as stipulated in the Agreement;

(c) Provide, in cooperation with other international partners in the mine action sector, de-mining assistance and technical advice;

(d) Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel in coordination with relevant Abyei Area bodies as defined by the Agreement;

(e) Strengthen the capacity of the Abyei Police Service by providing support, including the training of personnel, and coordinate with the Abyei Police Service on matters of law and order; and

(f) When necessary and in cooperation with the Abyei Police Service, provide security for oil infrastructure in the Abyei Area;

3. *Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes UNISFA within its capabilities and its area of deployment to take the necessary actions to:

(a) Protect UNISFA personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment;

(b) Protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment;

(c) Ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian personnel and members of the Joint Military Observers Committee and Joint Military Observer Teams;

(d) Without prejudice to the responsibilities of the relevant authorities, to protect civilians in the Abyei Area under imminent threat of physical violence;

(e) Protect the Abyei Area from incursions by unauthorized elements, as defined in the Agreement; and

(f) Ensure security in the Abyei Area;

4. *Requests* that the Secretary-General and the Government of Sudan, in consultation with the Government of Southern Sudan or its successor, conclude a status-of-forces agreement immediately after the adoption of this resolution, taking into consideration General Assembly resolution 64/77 on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel, and, *acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, *decides* that, until such an agreement is concluded, the status-of-forces agreement for the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of UNISFA;

5. *Calls on* all Member States to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from Abyei of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, which are for the exclusive and official use of UNISFA;

6. *Underscores* the imperative of expeditious deployment of UNISFA and *urges* the Secretary-General to take necessary steps to ensure rapid and efficient implementation;

7. *Urges* the Government of Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan or its successor to fully cooperate with each other and provide full support to UNISFA, enabling it to fully implement the mandate;

8. *Stresses* that improved cooperation between the Government of Sudan and Government of Southern Sudan or its successor, is also critical for peace, security and stability and the future relations between them;

9. *Calls upon* the Government of Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan or its successor urgently to fulfil their commitment under the CPA to resolve peacefully the final status of Abyei, and *calls upon* them to consider in good faith proposals the African Union High Level Implementation Panel shall make to resolve this matter;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that effective human rights monitoring is carried out, and the results included in his reports to the Council;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of the progress in implementing the Agreement and to report to the Council no later than thirty days after the adoption of this resolution and every 60 days thereafter;

12. *Decides* to review UNISFA's role in the implementation of the Agreement not later than 3 months after adoption of this resolution;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance of UNISFA with the United Nations zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and to keep the Council informed if cases of such conduct occur;

14. *Decides* to remain actively seized of matter.

United Nations S/2011/390

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 June 2011

Original: English

France, Gabon, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Stressing the primary responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for ensuring security in its territory and protecting its civilians with respect for the rule of law, human rights and international humanitarian law,

Acknowledging that the overall peace and security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has improved in recent years,

Stressing that significant security challenges remain in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including the continued presence of armed groups in the Kivus and Orientale Province, serious abuses and violations of human rights and acts of violence against civilians, limited progress in building professional and accountable national security and rule of law institutions, and illegal exploitation of natural resources,

Commending the enhanced regional cooperation in the Great Lakes region and *encouraging* further efforts to promote peace and stability in the region, including through existing regional mechanisms, and to intensify their efforts on regional economic development,

Stressing that the successful holding of timely, inclusive, peaceful, credible and transparent elections, in accordance with the constitution and international standards, is a key condition for the consolidation of democracy, national reconciliation and restoration of a stable, peaceful and secure environment in which stabilization and socio-economic development can progress in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and *emphasizing* the need to promote participation of women in the electoral process,

Recognizing the importance of supporting peacebuilding efforts in order to achieve further progress in the stabilization of the country, *underlining* the importance of economic development to ensure long-term stabilization and peace

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consolidation, and *stressing* the need for sustained international support to ensure early recovery activities and lay the foundations for sustainable development,

Remaining greatly concerned by the humanitarian situation and the persistent high levels of violence and human rights abuses and violations against civilians, *condemning* in particular the targeted attacks against civilians, widespread sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment and use of children by parties to the conflict, forced displacement and extrajudicial executions, *reiterating the urgent need* for the swift prosecution of all perpetrators of human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations, *urging* the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in cooperation with the United Nations and other relevant actors, to implement the appropriate responses to address these challenges, including in Walikale, and to provide security, medical, legal, humanitarian and other assistance to victims,

Recalling its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1960 (2010) on women, peace and security, its resolution 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and its resolution 1882 (2009) on children and armed conflict, and *recalling* the conclusions of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict pertaining to parties in the armed conflict of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, especially in relation to the adoption of action plans to put an end to the recruitment and use of children,

Condemning all attacks against United Nations peacekeepers and humanitarian personnel, regardless of their perpetrators and *emphasizing* that those responsible for such attacks must be brought to justice,

Recognizing the significant sacrifices made by MONUSCO, *expressing appreciation* for its efforts to improve peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Emphasizing the importance of the continued support of the United Nations and the international community for the long-term security and development of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Encouraging relevant international actors to support efforts and to assist in the restoration of basic services, especially in conflict-affected areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Calling upon the African Union and all relevant subregional organizations to further engage in support of the stabilization efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, notably in the fields of security and combating illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), dated 12 May 2011, and of its recommendations,

Determining that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to extend until 30 June 2012 the mandate of MONUSCO as set out in resolution 1925 (2010), paragraphs 2, 11 and 12 (a) to (p) and (r) to (t), *reaffirms* that the protection of civilians must be given priority in decisions about

the use of available capacity and resources and *encourages further* the use of innovative measures implemented by MONUSCO in the protection of civilians;

2. *Reiterates* that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo bears primary responsibility for security, peacebuilding and development in the country, and *encourages* the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to remain fully committed to protecting the civilian population through the establishment of professional and sustainable security forces and the rule of law and respect for human rights, to promote non-military solutions as an integral part of the overall solution for reducing the threat posed by Congolese and foreign armed groups and to restore full State authority in the areas freed from armed groups;

3. *Welcomes* its enhanced dialogue with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, *reiterates* that the challenges the Democratic Republic of the Congo is facing as it enters a phase of stabilization and peace consolidation require a strategic partnership with the United Nations, including with MONUSCO, *welcomes* the constructive approach of the Congolese authorities and MONUSCO in this regard, in particular through the joint assessment process, and *encourages* the continuing of such assessment discussions with a view to enabling the Security Council to continue to make informed decisions regarding any reconfiguration of the Mission, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 7 of resolution 1925 (2010);

4. *Reiterates* that future reconfigurations of MONUSCO should be determined on the basis of the evolution of the situation on the ground and on the achievement of the following objectives to be pursued by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Mission:

(a) The completion of the ongoing military operations in the Kivus and Orientale Province, resulting in reducing to a minimum the threat from armed groups and restoring stability in sensitive areas;

(b) An improved capacity of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to effectively protect the population through the establishment of professional, accountable and sustainable security forces with a view to progressively taking over MONUSCO's security role;

(c) The consolidation of State authority throughout the territory, through the deployment of Congolese civil administration, in particular the police, territorial administration and rule of law institutions in areas freed from armed groups;

5. *Recognizes* the primary responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its national partners to create propitious conditions for the forthcoming elections, *urges* the Government as well as all relevant parties to ensure an environment conducive to a free, fair, credible, inclusive, transparent, peaceful and timely electoral process, which includes free and constructive political debate, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, equitable access to media including State media, safety for all candidates, as well as for election observers and witnesses, journalists, human rights defenders and actors from the civil society including women, *calls upon* the Congolese authorities to ensure secure conditions for the conduct of and unrestricted access to the polls, including through cooperation with MONUSCO, consistent with the Mission's role with regard to the protection of civilians and *calls upon* all parties to respect the results of the polls;

6. *Calls upon* the Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI), political parties and relevant Congolese authorities to swiftly adopt and implement codes of conduct and ensure timely accreditation of national and international observers;

7. *Decides* that MONUSCO shall support the organization and conduct of national, provincial and local elections, through the provision of technical and logistical support as requested by the Congolese authorities, by facilitating enhanced and regular dialogue with the CENI including through the Election Partnership Committee, by supporting the CENI in facilitating dialogue among various Congolese stakeholders, by monitoring, reporting and following up on human rights violations in the context of the elections, and by using the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of Congo as required;

8. *Calls upon* MONUSCO and the United Nations Country Team to collect information on and identify potential threats against the civilian population, as well as reliable information on violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, bring them to the attention of the Congolese authorities as appropriate, and to take appropriate action in accordance with the United Nations system-wide protection strategy in harmonization with MONUSCO's protection strategy, and *further requests* MONUSCO, consistent with its mandate and within its current capabilities, to provide assistance and advice to the Congolese authorities with security preparations in relation to elections;

9. *Calls upon* the international community to remain engaged in supporting the elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and *urges* donors to swiftly provide equipment and financial support for the training of the Congolese National Police (PNC), with a view to enhancing Congolese efforts in this regard;

10. *Requests* MONUSCO, consistent with the authorization provided by resolution 1925 (2010), to keep a reserve force capable of redeploying rapidly in the country within its mandated strength;

11. *Reiterates* the primary responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo regarding the professionalization of its security sector and *urges* the Congolese authorities, with the support of MONUSCO, to develop and implement a comprehensive national security sector development strategy, in order to establish democratic, accountable and professional national security institutions, *urges* the Government to swiftly adopt the relevant legislation and to coordinate, with the support of MONUSCO, the efforts of the international community, including all bilateral and multilateral actors working on security sector development issues, and *calls upon* all Member States and international organizations to fully cooperate with the Congolese authorities in this regard;

12. *Encourages* the Government to address the underlying issue of the cohesion of the national Army, including by further developing its efforts to ensure proper integration and vetting of former armed groups, in particular the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and *expresses concern* at the promotion within the Congolese security forces of well-known individuals responsible for serious human rights abuses;

13. *Demands* that all armed groups, in particular Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), immediately cease all forms of violence and human rights abuses against the civilian population in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular against women and children, including rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and demobilize;

14. *Takes note* of the respective initiatives taken by the United Nations and the African Union to facilitate regional action against the LRA and to protect civilians, *reiterates* the need to enhance cooperation of all relevant parties to help address the threat to civilians posed by the LRA, *welcomes* the steps taken by MONUSCO to enhance information sharing and coordination with those conducting military operations against the LRA and *encourages* MONUSCO to continue to keep close contacts with LRA-affected communities and keep under review the deployment of its available resources to ensure maximum effect;

15. *Acknowledges* the results of the action taken to address the threat of foreign and national armed groups, particularly the progress made against the FDLR, including through the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) process, *urges* the international community and donors to support the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUSCO in DDRRR activities, *calls upon* the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and neighbouring States to remain engaged in the process and *urges* the Government to make progress on the national programme for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of residual Congolese armed elements in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, with the support of MONUSCO;

16. *Encourages* the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to continue to build on its cooperation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflicts and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and to meet, without further delay, its commitments to adopt and implement an action plan to halt the recruitment and use of children by the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), in close collaboration with MONUSCO;

17. *Welcomes* the initial steps taken by the mining authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and throughout the region to address the tracing and certification of minerals, *encourages* further demilitarization of the mining areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the professionalization and deployment of Congolese Mining Police in these areas, and *calls upon* MONUSCO to support the relevant Congolese authorities in preventing the provision of support to armed groups from illicit economic activities and illicit trade and natural resources, including to carry out spot checks and regular visits to mining sites, trade routes and markets, in the vicinity of the five pilot trading counters;

18. *Urges* the Congolese Government to approve the multi-year joint United Nations justice support programme and to implement it, with the support of international partners, *welcomes* the positive steps taken by the Congolese authorities to try those responsible for human rights violations, including rape in South Kivu, *encourages* the Congolese authorities to promote lasting reconciliation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by pursuing these efforts to combat impunity against all perpetrators of human rights and international humanitarian law

violations, including those committed by any illegal armed groups or elements of the Congolese security forces;

19. *Commends* the Congolese Government for the apprehension and the transfer to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda of Bernard Munyagishari, fugitive from international criminal justice, *further stresses* the importance of the Congolese Government actively seeking to hold accountable those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country and of regional cooperation to this end, including through cooperation with the International Criminal Court and *calls upon* MONUSCO to use its existing authority to assist the Government in this regard;

20. *Calls upon* MONUSCO to continue to work with the United Nations Country Team and the Congolese authorities towards the adoption and implementation of the Peace Consolidation Programme covering provinces not affected by the conflict and to continue to support the implementation of the Government's Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan (STAREC) including through the implementation of the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) and *calls upon* donors to support these efforts;

21. *Demands* that all parties cooperate fully with the operations of MONUSCO and that they ensure the security of as well as unhindered and immediate access for United Nations and associated personnel in carrying out their mandate, throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and *requests* the Secretary-General to report without delay any failure to comply with these demands;

22. *Commends* the contribution of troop- and police-contributing countries and donors to MONUSCO and *calls on* Member States to pledge and provide the remaining force enablers required for the mission;

23. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report in October 2011, in January 2012 and by 23 May 2012 on the progress on the ground, *further requests* the Secretary-General to regularly brief and inform it on the significant events of the electoral process, including on MONUSCO's support to this process, and to provide a comprehensive assessment of the political, security, humanitarian and human rights environment following the elections, and *requests* the Secretary-General to provide in these reports an indication of progress towards achieving a coordinated United Nations approach in-country, and in particular on critical gaps to achieving peacebuilding objectives alongside the Mission;

24. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2011/391

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 June 2011
English
Original: French

Letter dated 27 June 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1985 (2011), by which the Council decided to extend until 12 June 2012 the mandate of the Panel of Experts established in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009), and requested me to take the necessary administrative measures to that effect.

Consequently, I wish to inform you that, following consultations with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), I have renewed the mandates of the following experts:

- Mr. John Everard (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): regional questions;
- Mr. George A. Lopez (United States of America): finances;
- Mr. Erik Marzolf (France): missile technology;
- Mr. Duk Ho Moon (Republic of Korea): proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- Mr. Alexander Vilnin (Russian Federation): customs;
- Mr. Xiaodong Xue (China): export control, nuclear materials;
- Mr. Takehiko Yamamoto (Japan): nuclear questions.

I have appointed Mr. John Everard Coordinator of the Panel of Experts.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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United Nations S/2011/392

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 June 2011
English
Original: French

Letter dated 27 June 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you the attached letter dated 8 June 2011 from Mr. Patrick Robinson, President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (see annex).

In his letter, Mr. Robinson requests the extension of the terms of office of the judges at the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia based on the trial and appeals schedule. The current terms of office of the judges of the Trial Chambers and the Appeals Chamber will expire on 31 December 2011 and 31 December 2012, respectively. I recall that the Security Council and the General Assembly, in resolution 1931 (2010) and decision 64/416 C, respectively, underlined their intention to extend, by 30 June 2011, the terms of office of the trial judges based on the Tribunal's projected trial schedule.

Mr. Robinson also requests that eight ad litem judges be permitted to serve at the Tribunal beyond the cumulative period of three years provided for under article 13 ter, paragraph 2, of the statute of the Tribunal. However, it may not be necessary to grant this request while the extension granted by Security Council resolution 1931 (2010) and General Assembly decision 64/416 C continues to apply.

It is for the Security Council and the General Assembly to consider and decide on these requests. Accordingly, I should be grateful if you would bring the letter from Mr. Robinson to the attention of members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex to the letter dated 27 June 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]

I have the honour of referring to Security Council resolution 1931 (2010) of 29 June 2010, in which the Council: (a) extended the terms of office of the judges of the Appeals Chamber until 31 December 2012 or until the completion of the cases to which they are assigned or until the completion of their term as members of the Appeals Chamber, if sooner; (b) extended the terms of office of the permanent judges of the Trial Chambers until 31 December 2011 or until the completion of the cases to which they are assigned, if sooner; (c) extended the terms of office of the ad litem judges of the Trial Chambers until 31 December 2011 or until the completion of the cases to which they are assigned, if sooner; (d) allowed certain ad litem judges to serve at the Tribunal beyond the cumulative period of service provided for under article 13 ter (2) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; and (e) underlined the Council's intention to extend, by 30 June 2011, the terms of office of the trial judges based on the Tribunal's projected trial schedule and requested the President of the Tribunal to submit to the Council updated trial and appeal schedules no later than 15 May 2011.

By the present letter, I wish to submit updated trial and appeal schedules[a] and to bring to your attention the necessity of extending the terms of office of the Tribunal's permanent and ad litem judges. Permission is also required for some of the ad litem judges to serve at the Tribunal beyond the cumulative period of service provided for under article 13 ter (2) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Having due regard to the Tribunal's current anticipated completion dates for all trial and appellate work, and considering General Assembly resolution 63/256 of 24 December 2008, which authorizes the Tribunal "to offer contracts to staff, in line with dates of planned post reductions in accordance with the relevant prevailing trial schedules", I am requesting extensions of the terms of office of the Tribunal's judges commensurate with those that the General Assembly has authorized for the Tribunal's staff.

By reference to the attached trial and appeal schedules (see enclosures), the following extensions are sought:

Permanent judges

An extension until 31 December 2014 or at the completion of the trials and/or appeals to which they are or will be assigned, if sooner, is sought for the following judges:

Judge Kwon (Republic of Korea)
Judge Antonetti (France)
Judge Hall (Bahamas)
Judge Delvoie (Belgium)
Judge Morrison (United Kingdom)

[a] The updated trial and appeal schedules were also submitted on 12 May 2011 in the most recent completion strategy report of the Tribunal (see S/2011/316).

An extension until 31 December 2015 or at the completion of the trials and/or appeals to which they are or will be assigned, if sooner, is sought for the following judges:

Judge Flügge (Germany)
Judge Orie (Netherlands)
Judge Moloto (South Africa)

An extension until 31 December 2014 or at the completion of the appeals to which they are or will be assigned, if sooner, is sought for the following judges:

Judge Robinson (Jamaica)
Judge Pocar (Italy)
Judge Liu (China)
Judge Meron (United States of America)
Judge Agius (Malta)

Ad litem judges

An extension until 31 December 2012 or at the completion of the trials to which they are currently assigned, if sooner, is sought for the following judges:

Judge Picard (France)
Judge Harhoff (Denmark)
Judge Gwaunza (Zimbabwe)
Judge Prandler (Hungary)
Judge Trechsel (Switzerland)
Judge Nyambe (Zambia)

An extension until 31 December 2014 or at the completion of the trials to which they are currently assigned, if sooner, is sought for the following judges:

Judge Baird (Trinidad and Tobago)
Judge Lattanzi (Italy)

An extension until 31 December 2015 or at the completion of the trials to which he is or will be assigned, if sooner, is sought for the following judge:

Judge Mindua (Democratic Republic of the Congo)

Additionally, the following judges require permission to serve at the Tribunal beyond the cumulative period of service provided for under article 13 ter (2) of the Statute of the Tribunal:

Judge Picard (France)
Judge Harhoff (Denmark)
Judge Gwaunza (Zimbabwe)
Judge Prandler (Hungary)
Judge Trechsel (Switzerland)
Judge Baird (Trinidad and Tobago)
Judge Lattanzi (Italy)
Judge Mindua (Democratic Republic of the Congo)

I would be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its enclosures to the attention of the Security Council and the General Assembly for their consideration.

(*Signed*) Patrick **Robinson**

11-39036

Enclosure I

Trial schedule of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia


as of 12 April 2011
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
RM
Prlić/Stojić/Praljak/Petković/Ćorić/Pušić (74 mths)
Judges Antonetti, Prandler, Trechsel, Mindua(R) trial began May 2006
Šešelj (59 mths)
Judges Antonetti, Harhoff, Lattanzi trial began Nov 2007
Gotovina/Čermak/Markač (36 mths)
Judges Orie, Kinis, Gwaunza trial began May 2008
Perišić (35 mths)
Judges Moloto, Davidi, Picard trial began Oct 2008
Stanišić/Simatović (38 mths)
Judges Orie, Picard, Gwaunza trial began June 2009
M. Stanišić/Župljanin (37 mths)
Judges Hall, Delvoie, Harhoff trial began Sep 2009
Karadžić (56 mths)
Judges Kwon, Morrison, Baird, Lattanzi(R) trial began Nov 2009
Tolimir (32 mths)
Judges Flügge, Mindua, Nyambe
Haradinaj et al. (13 mths)
Judges Moloto, Hall, Delvoie

Contempt proceedings (indictment or order in lieu of indictment filed):

1. IT-04-84-R77.1 Shefqet Kabashi (at large), indictment issued 5 June 2007
   Judges Orie, Moloto, Delvoie
2. IT-03-67-R77.3 Vojislav Šešelj, order in lieu of indictment issued on 3 February 2010
   Judges Kwon, Parker, Hall
3. IT-98-32/1-R77.2 Jelena Rašić, indictment confirmed 26 August 2010
   Judges Morrison, Hall, Delvoie

Fugitives: to be tried upon arrival
Mladić
Hadžić

Key: ongoing, adjournment, pre-trial, fugitive, re-trial

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Enclosure II

Appeal schedule of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia



(including time for filing Notice of Appeal)

Extension due to TC Judgement translation *(only for the self represented accused and French benches)*

* *On the assumption that a solution is found to address the translation issues in this case, no extra time has been added for translation from French to English.*

** *Seselj: TC Judgement translation into BCS and English: 9 months (CLSS estimated number of UN standard pages 1000).*

*** *Tolimir: TC Judgement translation into BCS, 9 months (CLSS estimated number of UN standard pages 1000).*

**** *Karadzic: TC Judgement translation into BCS, 14 months (CLSS estimated number of UN standard pages 2000).*

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Enclosure III

Appeal schedule of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda



S/2011/392